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EMPOWERING PATIENTS TO ACT LIKE
CONSUMERS: A PROPOSAL CREATING
PRICE AND QUALITY CHOICE WITHIN
HEALTH CARE
ANDREW RUSKIN
INTRODUCTION
Although America's health care industry has undergone a
tremendous evolutionary surge in the past decade, there is no in-
dication that the pace of change will relax anytime soon. Before
the pace could relent, the American public would need to be
largely content with its health care system. Yet there are many
signs that the public is still discontented with its care.' The me-
dia are filled with reports concerning dissatisfaction of enrollees
in managed care plans, the lack of choice of physicians imposed
by their plans, and the delay or ultimate denial of payment for
necessary care.2 Managed care has thus become a major focus of
the criticism launched against the present health care system.3
All of the negative attention focusing on managed care has led to
a general distrust of the present health care system, and a fear of
I See Health Care Access for the Uninsured Through Tax Increases Would be
Supported by 64% of Americans, W.K Kellogg Foundation Survey Finds, HEALTH
NEWS DAILY, Jan. 14, 1999, available in 1999 WL 10482995 (citing a poll conducted
by the W.K. Kellogg Foundation which found that 50% of Americans are dissatisfied
with health care in the United States).
2 See, e.g., George Anders & Ron Winslow, Turn for the Worse: HMOs' Woes Re-
flect Conflicting Demands of American Public, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 1997, at Al
(stating that the movement towards point-of-service plans, which allow easier access
to out-of-network physicians, is partially in response to consumer criticism regarding
lack of choice of providers); Louise Kertesz, Trouble for HMOs?, MODERN
HEALTHCARE, May 12, 1997, at 48, 50 (chart) (indicating that as HMO markets ma-
ture, consumers experience an increasing number of problems with delays in care or
problems receiving care).
3 See Abigail Trafford, Commentary, Who's Dissing Managed Care?, WASH.
POST, Jan. 20, 1998, at Z06 (describing the results of a Kaiser Family Foundation
study that noted a dramatic increase in negative media stories focused on managed
care from 1990 to 1997).
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eroding quality of the medical care provided in this country.4
Clearly, managed care is not the panacea for what ails the coun-
try's health care delivery system. Despite the problems wrought
by managed care, it is also evident that the American public does
not want to pay more for its health care.5 Thus, it is unlikely
that there would be any public mandate in favor of returning to
the costly fee-for-service health care system that preceded the in-
ception of managed care.6 Neither extreme has succeeded in
satisfying the American public.7 Therefore, the next evolutionary
phase in health care will require empowering the American pub-
lic to make the difficult choice between the denial of resources
associated with managed care and the skyrocketing costs associ-
ated with fee-for-service medicine.
This Article proposes changes to the present health care sys-
tem to allow the American people to maximize their satisfaction
with their health care system by facilitating informed decision-
making in their health care consumption choices. In most other
4 See Health Care Opinion Poll Finds Confusion, Worry over High Costs, Future
of System, 6 Health Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA) 766 (May 4, 1998), available in
WESTLAW, 6 HCP 766 (noting that Americans are losing trust in the health care
system and a majority believe that a major change is necessary).
5 See id. (citing surveys that show dissatisfaction with health insurance costs).
6 A fee-for-service payment system compensates providers for each service they
render. See HENRY BERMAN AND LOUISA ROSE, CHOOSING THE RIGHT HEALTH CARE
PLAN 49 (1990).
Fee-for-service arrangements create incentives to overutilize health care services
and thus drive up costs. See MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS 55
(1995). Between 1980 and 1993, a period during which fee-for-service payments were
largely considered the norm, expenditures on health care grew more than twice as
fast as the national inflation rate. See PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT
COMMISSION, MEDICARE AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS 16-17 (1995) [hereinafter PROPAC].
This led to an increased number of uninsured people, increased cost shifting
from employers to employees, and increased consumption of household resources on
health care spending. See id. at 23-27. Between 1988 and 1993, however, the
prevalence of conventional insurance decreased while managed care penetration in-
creased. See id. at 23 & tbl.9 (noting that the market share of traditional indemnity
plans had fallen from 72.6% in 1988 to 33.3% in 1993). In 1995, the inflation rate
increased more than the health care premiums. See Gail A. Jensen et al., The New
Dominance of Managed Care: Insurance Trends in the 1990s, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-
Feb. 1997, at 125, 134 (cautioning, however, that this correlation does not prove any
cause-effect relationship).
7 See Anders & Winslow, supra note 2, at Al (commenting that it is difficult to
get consumers, doctors, employees, and regulators to agree on what changes would
constitute an improvement of the health care system).
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markets, consumers are provided with choices among similar
products that vary in cost and quality. From these choices, con-
sumers can choose the product that most suits their preferences,
thereby maximizing their satisfaction. If a potential patient were
treated as a consumer, she also would be able to choose health
insurance and health care delivery services based on price and
quality, thereby increasing her satisfaction with the system.8
Due to the many obstacles in purchasing health care insurance
and health care delivery services along price and quality lines,
however, such satisfaction does not seem presently attainable.
After examining current health care market imperfections
preventing price and quality choices within health care pur-
chasing, and the historical trends that have created these imper-
fections, this Article proposes a system that seeks to correct these
flaws, thereby facilitating satisfaction with health care consump-
tion. Since the payment of insurance premiums accounts for
most of the resources expended by consumers in procuring health
care, this Article initially proposes offering consumers choices
among different price levels at the time of enrolling in an insur-
ance plan. These price levels would be tied to different levels of
compensation to be paid to providers when administering care to
the plan enrollees, which would correspond with different levels
of expected efficacy of the treatment provided.9 As these levels
would only reflect the intended efficacy level, this Article further
proposes that health care providers be required to disclose their
performance records in providing care as well as the costs in-
curred in achieving these results. The consumer could thus de-
8 The use of the feminine pronoun throughout is not intended to reflect the
author's view of the role of women in the health care industry. Rather, it is simply to
provide balance in scholastic writing. The intent of this author is to alternate be-
tween masculine and feminine pronouns in successive publications. In addition to
physicians and patients, the feminine pronoun is also used in this Article to refer to
providers. The meaning of the term provider includes physicians, hospitals, nursing
homes, and other health care-related entities.
9 The efficacy of a treatment regimen is the most important determinant of the
quality of care. Therefore, it naturally has a significant impact on the satisfaction
patients derive from the medical process. See Thomas Rice, Can Markets Give Us the
Health System We Want?, 22 J. HEALTH POL., POLY, & L. 383, 414 (1997) (stating
that within the health care setting, the measure of the medical effectiveness of a
service can be considered a proxy for the utility of a health care good). Utility refers
to the satisfaction one obtains from consuming goods. See THEODORE MORGAN,
INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMICS 116 (1956).
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termine for herself whether the actual price and efficacy level of
the treatment administered by a given provider meets with the
consumer's expectations at the price level that she chose when
she enrolled in the health plan. Through this encouragement of
price and quality health care purchasing, it is expected that
health care markets would more closely resemble other well-
functioning markets. Consequently, this would greatly enhance
the public's satisfaction with its health care system.10 In this
way, the evolution of the health care system would finally result
in a meaningful benefit to the American people.
I. THE DIVERGENCE OF THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY FROM THE
MODEL OF THE PERFECT MARKET
A. Model of the Perfect Market
Consumer dissatisfaction with the health care industry
stems from the ways in which the allocation of scarce health care
resources appear to negatively impact the cost and quality of
health care. Therefore, economic analysis can be instrumental in
finding solutions to this perceived misallocation. Economic
analysis centers around the concept of efficiency, which is the
production of the most aggregate benefit at the lowest aggregate
cost." In a perfect market, consumers contribute to the market's
efficiency by purchasing an ideal bundle of goods from which they
derive the most benefit. 12 Assessing the benefit of any individual
good is necessarily subjective, 3 and it is dependent in part on the
amount of the good that has already been purchased. 14 Since the
value of goods decrease with each incremental increase in the
10 See Ryan L. Everhart, New York Managed Care Legislation: A Substantive
Response to Corporate Medicine or a Token Gesture to Ease Consumer Concerns?, 46
BUFF. L. REV. 507, 537 n.195 (1998) (claiming that individual tastes and preferences
can find expression through market forces (citing Alain C. Enthoven & Sara J.
Singer, Markets and Collective Action in Regulating Managed Care, HEALTH AFF.,
Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 26, 26)).
11 See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7
(1989).
12 See Rice, supra note 9, at 386 (discussing utility maximizing behavior).
13 See MORGAN, supra note 9, at 116 (describing how an object that is appealing
to one individual is not necessarily appealing to others).
14 See id. at 117 (explaining the concept of marginal utility).
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consumption of each good,' 5 consumers need to have a choice
with respect to the amount of a good they can purchase to allow
them to maximize the benefit they attain from their purchases.
Once consumers are given this choice, they can compare the
desirable qualities and price of the good in question to those of all
alternative goods to determine how many units of each good to
purchase. 16 In purchasing this perfect set of goods, the consumer
maximizes the satisfaction attainable within the limits of her re-
sources.17 This ability of the consumer to maximize her satisfac-
tion is dependent on various conditions, including whether in-
formation about the goods to be consumed is too costly to
acquire.' 8 The market is said to be in a state of equilibrium when
it is characterized both by consumers acting in a way that maxi-
mizes their satisfaction and by firms producing goods that suit
consumer preferences at their lowest cost.' 9 In this ideal state,
resources are allocated in a manner that maximizes consumer
satisfaction because resource allocation is dictated by people's
choices. This means that goods are consumed by those who value
them the most.20
Further, wasteful uses of resources are minimized because
only goods and services demanded by consumers would be pro-
duced.21 By avoiding waste and the costs associated therewith,
this ideal market further serves to maximize consumer satisfac-
tion because the benefits derived from the resources consumed
are even cheaper to attain. This satisfaction only grows over
time because an ideal market encourages innovation,22 which in-
creases the benefits derived from goods while decreasing costs. 23
15 See id. (noting that the increased availability of a commodity leads to its de-
creased marginal utility).
16 See Rice, supra note 9, at 386 (noting that individuals maximize their utility
by purchasing according to their desire or taste for alternative goods, subject to their
available income).
17 See id.
18 See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 6-7
(1976) (noting that an individual's behavior may appear to be irrational when infor-
mation is incomplete).
19 See Rice, supra note 9, at 385-86.
20 See id.
21 See id.
22 Cf Enthoven & Singer, supra note 10, at 26.
23 Cf Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals ofAntitrust: Efficiency, Consumer
Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1025 (1987) (describ-
1999]
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Because of these positive attributes, economists often use this op-
timal state as the benchmark against which markets are measured.
B. Health Care Market Imperfections
Unlike the perfect market, most health care markets are
characterized by various attributes that prevent consumers from
making ideal health care consumption choices. One fundamental
obstacle to purchasing the ideal amount of health care is the
manner in which consumers enroll in insurance plans.
Most Americans receive their insurance through an em-
ployer.24 Many employers only offer one type of insurance,
thereby removing the ability of employees to choose a plan based
on its price and quality.25 Although other employers provide a
choice of insurance options, they subsidize the more expensive
plans such that each plan costs the same to the employee.26 Em-
ployees lose the opportunity to choose other goods of more value
when they are denied pay increases by an employer who chooses
to expend resources on health care subsidies.27 The federal gov-
ernment has also traditionally distorted the value of health in-
surance for employees by excluding the provision of health insur-
ance at the workplace from personal income. This creates a
disparity in the value attributed to health care consumption be-
tween those individuals receiving insurance through employers
and those purchasing insurance individually.28
In addition to these obstacles encountered by consumers at
the time of choosing insurance, their satisfaction with their
health care plan is also limited at the time of seeking medical
treatment. This is a result of the inadequate information that
has been provided, concerning the cost and quality of health care
ing innovation efficiency as one of the basic components of economic efficiency, which
"refers to a decision or event that increases ... total saved wealth").
24 See MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS 252 (1997) (stat-
ing that more than 75% of all private insurance is sold through employer groups).
25 See id. at 262 n.17 (indicating that 84% of employers providing insurance only
offer one option for an insurance plan).
26 See Helen Lippman, Are Employers Missing the Signs?, BUS. & HEALTH, Dec.
1997, at 36, 39 (citing a study that found that over half of the nation's large employ-
ers engage in this practice).27 See also Uwe Reinhardt, Managed Care is Still a Good Idea, WALL ST. J., Nov.
17, 1999, at A22.
28 See HALL, supra note 24, at 20.
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services rendered by providers.29 As a result of these various
market imperfections, the production and consumption of health
care goods and services deviates substantially from the ideal
state of production and consumption that would occur in a state
of equilibrium.30 As long as this deviation exists, the health care
system will remain incapable of fulfilling the expectations of the
American people.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF PRESENT HEALTH CARE MARKET
IMPERFECTIONS
Although it is often believed that the special nature of health
care goods and services invariably leads to the market anomalies
presently found within the health care industry, an examination
of the historic trends within the industry shows that the present
imperfections in the system stem from an evolutionary process.
The imperfections are merely adventitious so they can be re-
moved through further refinement to market forces.
To some degree, the health care industry operated similarly
to most other industries during its early stages. Just as transac-
tions usually occur between an individual buyer and an individ-
ual seller in most markets, doctors provided services to patients
and looked to the patient alone for payment.31 Yet even in its
earliest form, the health care industry exhibited differences from
other industries due to the patient's need to rely on her physi-
cian's judgment, which engenders a relationship of trust.32 The
physician has traditionally been responsible for making impor-
tant decisions on behalf of her patient with respect to treatment.
Consequently, the patient becomes the principal and the physi-
cian becomes the agent in the patient-physician relationship.33
See THE PRESIDENTS ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CONSUMER PROTECTION AND
QUALITY IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY, QUALITY FIRST: BETTER HEALTH CARE
FOR ALL AMERICANS 73 [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMMISSION] (stating
that useful information is neither uniformly nor widely available).
30 Cf supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits arising
from a market in a state of equilibrium).
31 See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 235-
36 (1982) (observing that prior to World War I patients paid doctors directly for
health care services).
32 See RODWIN, supra note 6, at 6.
33 See Paul A. Pautler & Michael G. Vita, Hospital Market Structure, Hospital
Competition, and Consumer Welfare: What Can the Evidence Tell Us?, 10 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLY 117, 120 (1994).
1999]
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The dual role of the physician as the vendor of services and
as the agent of the patient has always demonstrated the poten-
tial for conflicts of interest. The physician can gain financially at
the expense of the patient who is usually unable to fully evaluate
the potential benefits of the course of treatment proposed by the
physician.34 In the early stages of the industry, however, this po-
tential conflict was constrained largely by the limited finances of
the patient.35 The physician could not be compensated for pro-
viding more services than the patient could afford.
Over time, the tensions caused by the financial constraints
imposed by the patient's limited resources intensified. Health
care became more expensive with the rise of hospitals as the cen-
ter of the provision of health care.3 6 Seeking to remedy the fi-
nancial limitations imposed upon them, hospitals collaborated in
the late 1930s to form Blue Cross plans, which provided coverage
for health care rendered by hospitals.37
Soon thereafter, physicians founded Blue Shield plans to
provide insurance for physician services.38 In effect, insurance
companies were supplanting the patient as the purchaser,
thereby removing any incentive on the part of the patient, in her
capacity as principal, to constrain providers in their provision of
services.3 9 The ability to obtain insurance became easier in the
1940s when various Internal Revenue Service rulings stated that
employers could give workers insurance without tax conse-
quences, which led to increased incentives for employers to pro-
34 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Agency in the Market, in 3 HANDBOOK OF
MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 1183, 1183 (Kenneth J. Arrow & Michael D. Intriligator
eds., 1986) (stating that the trust placed by a principal in her agent only causes
problems where the availability of information is unequal, a usual occurrence within
the patient-physician context); Rex O'Neal, Note, Safe Harbor for Health Care Cost
Containment, 43 STAN. L. REV. 399, 401-02 (1991) (noting that the principal-agent
relationship between patient and physician is jeopardized when the two parties' in-
terests are not synchronized).
35 See STARR, supra note 31, at 235-36 (discussing how physicians regulated
fees according to the patient's ability to pay, which did not provide economic security
for the doctor, but was niore favorable to the physician than having a powerful or-
ganization dictate limits on the doctor's income or practice conditions).
36 See id. at 259.
37 See id. at 295-97.
38 See id. at 307 (stating that the first Blue Shield plan was formed in 1939 in
California).
39 See O'Neal, supra note 34, at 402 (asserting that insurance makes patients
insensitive to their health care costs).
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vide health insurance.40 In so doing, the employer became a sec-
ondary purchaser of health care services ancillary to the primary
role assumed by the insurance company who was making direct
payments to providers. Thus, the patient became further re-
moved from the financing of her health care.
The third party payor system also underwent tremendous
expansion in 1965 with the enactment of the Medicare and Medi-
caid systems.41 Originally designed to cover the aged and the
impoverished, respectively,42 these programs have expanded to
insure a significant portion of the populace.43 Like other insur-
ance enrollees, this newly covered population had little incentive
to constrain their providers in their choice of treatment regi-
mens. Besides removing the incentive from patients to perform
any sort of cost-benefit analysis with respect to their health care,
the rise of third party payors also removed the risk of non-
payment associated with the reliance for payment exclusively on
the financial resources of patients. 44 Not surprisingly, the arrival
of third party payors, thus, ushered in an era of tremendous
growth for the industry.45
Although third party payors became responsible for the bulk
of the payment for health care, they minimized their role con-
cerning providers' clinical judgment. Private and government
programs reimbursed hospitals based on their costs, and they
reimbursed physicians based on their charges.46 In so doing,
these payors capitulated to physician demands that the physi-
cians maintain control over all aspects of medical care.47 With
the influx of funds from third party payors and the lack of con-
40 See Brian P. Battaglia, The Shift Toward Managed Care and Emerging Li-
ability Claims Arising from Utilization Management and Financial Incentive Ar-
rangements Between Health Care Providers and Payers, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK
L.J. 155, 162 (1997) (stating that IRS rulings in the early 1940s suggested that em-
ployer-provided health coverage might be deductible).
41 See STARR, supra note 31, at 369.
42 See id.
43 In 1996, there were 36.1 million Medicaid recipients, see BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1998, at 123 tbl.178 (118th ed. 1998), there were 38.1 million people enrolled in
Medicare, see id. at 120 tbl.171.
44 See STARR, supra note 31, at 334.
45 In the period from 1960 to 1993, health care spending had gone from $27 bil-
lion to $898 billion. See PROPAC, supra note 6, at 14.
46 See STARR, supra note 31, at 385.
47 See id. at 387.
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straints in the provision of care, conditions were favorable for in-
vestment in technology. 48 The increasing use of technological ad-
vances in treatment further exacerbated the disparity of informa-
tion between patient and physician, further limiting the ability of
the patient to restrict the provider's use of resources in adminis-
tering treatment.4 9 Without any meaningful check on the scope
of their agency, either from insurance companies, the govern-
ment in their capacity as purchasers, or from patients in their
capacity as principals, physicians were free to profit greatly from
the system.
Since the country was not capable of perpetually withstand-
ing spiraling costs, managed care logically followed as the health
care industry's next evolutionary step. Managed care refers to a
style of health care financing that strives to control the way pro-
viders practice and the way that they make referrals. 50 Managed
Care Organizations ("MCO's") try to control providers directly
through utilization review, whereby providers need organiza-
tional approval before performing tests or procedures to assure
that the proposed course of treatment is medically necessary.51
Indirectly, MCO's accomplish their cost savings through payment
incentives to physicians to reduce care, such as the use of capita-
tion and withholds.52 In dictating the limits of acceptable physi-
cian practices, the MCO has encroached upon the patients' right
48 See id. at 384 (discussing investment in technology as one reason for increases
in the cost of health care, but implying that investment in technology might have
been more of a symptom of the lack of restraints in provider reimbursement, as op-
posed to an overriding cause of increased health care expenditures).
49 See id. at 4-5 (asserting that one of the reasons patients submit to their phy-
sician's authority is the close tie between physicians and science).
50 See RODWIN, supra note 6, at 138 (noting that managed care service providers
do not have an incentive to perform many services because with each service pro-
vided they incur costs, not revenues).
51 See Battaglia, supra note 40, at 170-71 (noting that "peer review" of proposed
treatment has evolved into "utilization management," which is a "critical link in the
cost containment process").
52 See RODWIN, supra note 6, at 14. Capitation refers to periodic payments made
to physicians that are based on the number of patients. See Wayne Blackmon, The
Emerging Convergence of the Doctrine of Informed Consent and Judicial Reinterpre-
tation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 377, 379
(1998). Withholds refer to the withholding of a certain portion of the physician's
compensation to be released only if the MCO meets certain financial targets. See id.
[73:651660
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as principal to determine the scope of the physician's agency.53
In effect, providers operating in a managed care environment
have two principals, potentially resulting in a conflict of interest.
Moreover, since the MCO also has dual allegiances to both the
patient, in her capacity as enrollee, and to the employer or gov-
ernment, in its capacity as purchaser, there is the potential for a
second conflict of interest to indirectly impact the patient-
physician relationship.54 Since patients lack sufficient informa-
tion to adequately monitor the quality of their health care,55 they
cannot determine what effect, if any, the potential conflicts of in-
terest have on their treatment. Placed in this murky position, it
is only natural for patients to have developed a sense of distrust
of the system.5 6
To address some of the concerns of health care consumers,
reforms of managed care are taking place both in the public and
private sectors. An overwhelming majority of states have passed
some form of legislation regulating the operation of MCO's. 57
There have also been several bills proposed at the national level
that would mandate coverage of emergency services that a" 'pru-
dent layperson' would consider necessary,"58 increase access to
physician specialists, 59 and make it easier for patients to sue
their health plans.60 The managed care industry itself has tried
to stave off the growing backlash against managed care by offer-
63 See RODWIN, supra note 6, at 153 (noting that the risk-sharing techniques of
HMO's and hospitals, which reward a physician if she administers a small amount
of services, compromise the loyalty of a physician to her patient).
54 See Businesses, Insurers Rally Opposition to Federal Health Mandates,
HEALTH LAW. NEWS, Mar. 1998, at 13 (quoting a Wall Street analyst who stated
that HMO's are agents of employers and the government).
55 See infra Part IV.B (outlining proposed disclosure guidelines that would re-
quire physicians to keep their patients well informed).
56 See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text (pointing to signs of discontent
with the health care system by the public).
57 At the present time, at least forty states have already enacted anti-managed
care legislation. See Anders & Winslow, supra note 2, at Al.
58 Eric Weissenstein, Reform Plans Advance, MOD. HEALTHCARE, June 29, 1998,
at 2.
59 See id.
60 See Rochelle Sharpe, Business Leaders Fight Regulation of Managed Care,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 1998, at A20 (noting that businesses are opposed to the pro-
posed Patient Access to Responsible Care Act because the statute would subject
health care providers to numerous lawsuits, thereby raising the cost of health insur-
ance).
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ing more point of service plans. 61 Both public and private initia-
tives, however, entail increased costs and will not necessarily in-
crease health care consumption along price and quality lines.62
Accordingly, irrespective of the implementation of these reforms,
public dissatisfaction with the health care system is not likely to
dissipate anytime soon.
III. GIVING CONSUMERS CHOICES WITH RESPECT TO THE COST
AND EFFICACY OF THEIR CARE
A. Creating the Levels of Care
As is evident from a historical analysis of the failure of the
health care industry to provide the amount of care the patient
wants at reasonable price, any proposed reform must address the
problems that come from both the insertion of intermediary pur-
chasers between the patient and provider, and the greater
amount of information available to the provider about treatment
options. Since it is widely believed that insurance serves a valid
purpose, it would not be a viable solution to simply remove all of
the intervening parties between the patient and the physician.63
61 See Anders & Winslow, supra note 2, at A8. Point-of-service plans refer to
plans that allow enrollees to receive care outside the network, but with higher
copayments. See id.
62 Point-of-service plans increase costs to HMO's because IMO's cannot control
the prices charged by out-of-network physicians. Due to problems controlling costs,
HMO's must raise their rates. See Anders & Winslow, supra note 2, at A8. According
to one source, government regulation aimed at facilitating lawsuits against health
plans has also raised the specter of higher premium rates by as much as 23%. See
Sharpe, supra note 60, at A20; see also Robert M. Goldberg, Why HMOs Now Love
Regulation, WALL ST. J., July 17, 1998, at A14 (asserting that contemplated regula-
tions will not make HMO's more competitive and will not create incentives to im-
prove the quality of care).
M The utility people attach to wealth increases with their level of wealth, but at
a decreasing rate, because people do not value wealth as highly once they fulfill their
more important needs. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT
LAW 186-92 (1987). With respect to losses, therefore, people give greater weight to
the magnitude of the potential loss than to the probability of loss in determining the
expected value of the loss. See id. at 186. This concern is known as risk aversion. See
id. (noting that risk-averse people would choose to be in a position where they had a
10% chance of losing $10,000 rather than a position where they stand a 5% chance of
losing $20,000). For these people, providing insurance maximizes their welfare with-
out negatively affecting their behavior and is thus socially desirable. See id. at 213;
see also HALL, supra note 24, at 20 (stating that there are psychic benefits to buying
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It is possible, however, to provide consumers with the advantages
of insurance without totally eliminating their control over the
price of health care.
The purchase of health insurance can reflect the value of
health care to the consumer by offering the consumer several dif-
ferent health insurance packages, each with its own price and
features. Each package would represent a different level of re-
imbursement to be paid to a provider when the enrollee seeks
medical treatment. The provider could submit a claim to the in-
surer containing both the enrollee's Diagnosis Related Group
("DRG") and reimbursement level, which together would deter-
mine the amount to be paid to the provider.64
These levels of reimbursement would correspond to stan-
dardized levels of intended efficacy of care that would become
recognized by consumers over time.65 For instance, there could
be a base level that reimburses at a rate designed to cover all
generally accepted practices provided by a physician of average
ability. From this base level, adjustments could be made that
would be designed to cover marginally beneficial procedures, or
procedures carried out by a physician with a higher skill level,
with corresponding higher rates.66 There could also be a level
that reimburses all possible expenses generated in the provision
of care, even for care that is experimental in nature. In addition
to standardizing the character of each level, the number of levels
would also need to be predetermined. The number should not be
so large as to overwhelm the consumer, making it impossible for
insurance because people do not have to worry about paying for medical expenses at
the time of receiving care).
6 DRG's are the basis of Medicare's payments to hospitals. See RODWIN, supra
note 6, at 15. Medicare pays hospitals a flat rate per admission as determined by the
patient's diagnosis. See id. This flat rate is based on the average cost of treating pa-
tients within the patient's DRG. See id.
65 Cf O'Neal, supra note 34, at 440 (suggesting that to create a threshold for
what constitutes a socially optimal standard of care, an independent commission
could be established that follows the process used in Oregon's Medicaid reform ini-
tiative of ranking treatments according to their efficacy, and then determining a
cutoff point).
66 See Maxwell J. Mehbman, The Patient-Physician Relationship in an Era of
Scarce Resources: Is There a Duty to Treat?, 25 CONN. L. REV. 349, 354-55 (1993)
(hypothesizing that in an optimal market, patients would bargain both for quantity
of services and for standards of physician behavior).
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the consumer to choose the level that suits her preferences. 67
Rather, a manageable number should foster an ability for the
consumer to compare and contrast the levels, and ultimately
choose one that fits her needs.68 Through the implementation of
a system that allows the consumer to choose the desired level of
cost and efficacy of her care, the insurance company would be, in
effect, requiring the consumer to make the same choices about
her care that, in the absence of the availability of insurance, she
would have to make when seeking medical treatment. By simu-
lating the health care purchasing process at the time of enroll-
ment, the insurance company can allow the consumer to reap the
benefits of insurance coverage without totally removing her from
the role of purchaser.
Each reimbursement level is intended to cover health care
services of a certain degree of efficacy; therefore, reimbursement
rates must be set accordingly. Ideally, consumers would possess
sufficient information to describe the types of procedures and
physician skill levels they would want covered by each reim-
bursement level.69 Since most consumers do not possess such in-
formation,70 the next best alternative would be to delegate the re-
sponsibility of setting reimbursement rates to an organization
whose determinations would be sound and reliable. An inde-
pendent physician board could be established in each field of
67 See Mark A. Hall, A Theory of Economic Informed Consent, 31 GA. L. REV.
511, 578 (1997) (asserting that an adequate but limited number of choices is better
than an infinite number of choices because, though short of perfect autonomy, the
realistic goal of social legitimacy is achieved (citing CLARK C. HAVIGHURsT, HEATH
CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFORM 159-65
(1995)).
68 See Marc A. Rodwin, Consumer Protection and Managed Care: Issues, Reform
Proposals, and Trade-Offs, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 1319, 1369 (1996) (stating that it is
necessary to restrict the number and type of insurance policies to a few standardized
policies to foster ease of comparability). This limitation on type and number of varia-
tions between policies also means that all policies must provide care for all types of
diseases, albeit at different levels of efficacy of treatment. Even though excluding
certain illnesses can mean vast decreases in costs, the benefits of standardization,
such as engendering ease of comparison, militate against permitting such policies.
See, e.g., Lauren Merlin Walker, How We Keep Health Costs Under a Grand, BUS. &
HEALTH, Aug. 1997, at 20, 21-25 (pointing out how one company managed to reduce
health care costs for its employees by excluding coverage for neonatal illnesses).
69 See supra Part L.A (describing that in a perfect market, consumers have ade-
quate information about the products available to allow them to express their pref-
erences in their choice of purchases).
70 See supra notes 29, 32-34, 49 and accompanying text.
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medical specialty to fulfill this role.71 Such a board would be
comprised of professionals that have sufficient expertise to make
sound determinations based on valid medical data. The board's
independence fosters reliance because these boards would not
face conflicts of interest as would the physicians who provide the
treatment and the insurers who pay for the treatment.72 These
independent physician boards would only be a surrogate for di-
rect consumer action, but they would help to remedy some of the
imbalance of power in both the patient-physician-patient and the
enrollee-insurer relationships that stem from unequal access to
information.
The independent physician boards would be required to es-
tablish rates for each DRG at each reimbursement level. To ac-
complish this task, the independent physician boards would need
to look at all possible procedures for each DRG. These proce-
dures would need to be grouped into those that are clearly bene-
ficial and those that are marginally beneficial. The independent
physician boards would also look at physician rates to determine
average charges generated for each DRG as well as the charges of
physicians possessing superior skill. From this information, the
independent physician boards could then establish rates for each
DRG and for each level of intended efficacy within the DRG by
adding the costs of the procedures with the labor to be included
in each DRG level. 73 Restricted to providing services that fit
71 Cf Mehman, supra note 66, at 390 (suggesting that physicians should take
collective action to balance the needs of patients with the need to contain costs). The
Federal Agency for Health Care Policy and Research has established the Office of
the Forum for Quality and Effectiveness in Health Care, which is responsible for
creating and updating clinical guidelines. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 299b, 299b-1 (1994); see
also William R. Trail & Brad A. Allen, Government Created Medical Practice Guide-
lines: The Opening of Pandora's Box, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 231, 233-34 (1995-96).
These guidelines are to be developed as aids to practitioners in making decisions
about appropriate care. See id. at 234.
72 See supra Part H (discussing the potential conflicts of interest faced by pro-
viders and insurers).
73 See Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal Standards Governing
Physician Liability, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 114 (1991) (proposing that the
formulation of guidelines with different standards of care that take cost into consid-
eration, which could then be used by third party payors in their contracts). This cost
evaluation would be feasible if there is an emphasis on determining the costs en-
tailed in different procedures, which is an aspect of research that has not yet re-
ceived much emphasis. See E. Andrew Balas et al., Interpreting Cost Analyses of
Clinical Interventions, 279 JAMA 54, 54 (1998) (concluding that economic analysis
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within these cost parameters, physicians would find that the
scope of their treatment is limited to the intentions of the patient
as expressed by the choice of reimbursement level that she made
at the time of insurance enrollment.
Though the physician's scope of authority would be limited
by this choice-based system, it need not be totally removed. Both
providers and patients should have access to the guidelines upon
which the independent physician boards based their reimburse-
ment rate assessments.74 The provider and patient should ac-
cordingly be allowed to agree to these guidelines throughout the
course of treatment. A patient should, however, maintain the
right to permit the provider to use other techniques that may
prove more effective at about the same cost.75 In some cases, it
may even be necessary to veer from the guidelines when it is
clear to the physician that the patient will not receive the in-
tended benefits due to the individual characteristics of the pa-
tient.76 In the event that the costs of treatment exceed the reim-
bursement rate, the provider would be the better risk-bearer
because she could diversify this risk over the course of treating
many patients. 77 Thus, the provider should be responsible for
costs that deviate by a certain percentage from the reimburse-
ment rate.78 Where the treatment regimen agreed to by the pa-
tient and provider, however, is significantly different, such that
the treatment no longer accords with the reimbursement level
has not played a significant role in clinical trials, which has contributed to an in-
ability of practitioners to consider the cost implications of their treatment regimens).
74 See Trail & Allen, supra note 71, at 254 (suggesting that providers and the
public should have access to guidelines).
75 This system would avoid the pitfall of stifling innovation through the use of
practice guidelines, a criticism often associated with the use of guidelines. See, e.g.,
Arnold J. Rosoff, The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Health Care Reform, 5
HEALTH MATRIx 369, 386 (1995) (quoting the AMA's concerns about the effect of
guidelines on innovation, as stated by Edward Hirshfeld, Director of the Health Law
Division, Office of the General Counsel of the American Medical Association).
76 Cf HALL, supra note 24, at 84 (noting that treatment rules cannot anticipate
all the problems that might arise in each individual episode of care).
77 Cf RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 153-56 (5th ed. 1996) (describing the reduction of risk of an individual
stock through diversification, which is accomplished through ownership of several
stocks simultaneously).
78 Cf RODWIN, supra note 6, at 15 (explaining that hospitals are responsible for
costs exceeding the DRG rate, but retain any amounts that the DRG rate exceeds
actual costs under the Medicare reimbursement system).
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chosen at the time of purchasing insurance, it is likely that medi-
cal costs will deviate beyond what would be deemed reasonable
for the physician to bear. In these cases, the patient should be
held liable for any additional amounts in excess of the deviation
to be borne by the physician. By allowing further patient-
physician agreements, the choice-based system avoids sacrificing
the advantages of case-specific care in attaining treatment fo-
cused on patient expectations.
Similar to the need for adjustments within the patient-
physician relationship, it is necessary to recognize that the
changing nature of the information accessible to the independent
physician boards requires that the reimbursement rates be peri-
odically updated. The independent physician boards could peri-
odically review the medical literature to determine if the efficacy
of new procedures has been established.7 9 Initially, it would be
necessary to determine whether the new procedure has proven to
be so efficacious as to require its acceptance as a generally ac-
cepted practice, or whether it merely produces marginal benefits,
allowing for inclusion only at a higher reimbursement level.
Once included at the appropriate level, the costs of treatment of
the affected DRGs would need to be recalculated, and corre-
sponding adjustments to the reimbursement rates would need to
be made. Further information about new, efficacious treatment
regimens could come from discussions with practitioners about
their results with different techniques, which could also be incor-
porated into the established guidelines as well as the reim-
bursement rate calculations.80 Not limited to a review of new
practices, the independent physician boards would need to review
physician charges to determine if economic factors require ad-
justments to the reimbursement rates. Through allowance of
these adjustments, patient choice can be honored without limit-
ing the evolution of the system.
79 Cf Trail & Allen, supra note 71, at 240-41 (referring to the AMA's pro-
nouncements on practice parameters which state that, among other requirements,
practice parameters must be updated to reflect current information).
80 Cf id. (noting that the AMA pronouncements also require that the practice
parameters be subject to peer review).
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B. Reforms Required to Implement Consumer Choice
1. Reforms Relating to Financing Health Care
To implement a system centered on consumer choice, the
roles of the various parties providing health care financing would
need to undergo significant changes. Since Medicare covers a
large percentage of the population,8' a choice-based system could
not be meaningfully implemented without Medicare reform.
Though limited in nature, Medicare does allow for some price and
quality choices for its beneficiaries. Medicare beneficiaries are
entitled to comprehensive hospital benefits and, with the pay-
ment of premiums, deductibles, and copayments, they are also
entitled to comprehensive physician services.8 2 The deductibles
and copayments are waived, however, when the beneficiary en-
rolls in a Medicare HMO.8 3 Thus, the beneficiary has a choice be-
tween the type of care associated with fee-for-service insurance
at one price, and the type of care associated with MCO's at an-
other price.
There are salient differences in the features of these types of
care, affecting the degree of satisfaction a beneficiary would ob-
tain in choosing one program over another.8 4 Since there are no
standardized rules as to the breadth of services or the requisite
skill level of providers administering care through each type of
plan,85 important quality-related aspects of the treatment process
are not subject to consumer choice. To allow greater expression
of consumer choice within Medicare, the system should be re-
vised to provide for Medicare vouchers. Each beneficiary would
receive a voucher of a fixed amount that could be used to pur-
81 In 1996, 38.1 million people were enrolled in Medicare. See BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, supra note 43, at 120 tbl.171.
82 See generally PROPAC, supra note 6, at 65-73 (discussing Medicare Parts A
and B).
83 See Carol S. Jimenez, Medicare HMOs: A Consumer Perspective, 26 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1195, 1197-98 (1996) (discussing the benefits of Medicare HMO's).
84 See Andrew Ruskin, Note, Unbridled Managed Care: When Consumers Expe-
rience Antitrust Welfare Loss from Exclusionary Contracts Between HMO Insurers
and Health Care Providers, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 391, 416-21 (1996) (discussing the
competitive differences between HMO's and fee-for-service insurance).
85 See Enthoven & Singer, supra note 10, at 27 (asserting that free markets can
result in better selection of physicians than the government because the government
must abide by due process principles and may only remove a provider after obtain-
ing proof of very serious problems).
[73:651
EMPOWERING PATIENTS
chase care through an insurer offering a choice among the stan-
dardized levels of intended efficacy of care.86 When enrollees are
content with a level of care that is less costly than the voucher
amount, they could opt either for cash or for funds to be placed in
a Medical Savings Account ("MSA7). 87  For those who want a
higher level of care than that provided by the voucher system,
they would be permitted to supplement the amount received from
the government.88 For enrollees that are content with the level of
care that they could purchase with the voucher alone, no adjust-
ments would be required. In addition to the benefit of increasing
enrollee satisfaction by prioritizing freedom of choice, this change
would result in more predictability of Medicare program costs,
thereby allowing better governmental planning, and limiting the
risks of insolvency of the program.8 9 Hence, beyond the need to
satisfy consumers, fiscal responsibility also dictates that these
changes to the system be made.
Like the Medicare program, employers provide financing for
health insurance for a large number of individuals; therefore,
employer coverage practices would also need to be revamped to
provide for greater consumer choice. Employers remove the
ability of employees to purchase health insurance along price
lines by either limiting employees to one choice of health plan or
by subsidizing the more expensive plans to the degree that the
employee pays the same amount, irrespective of the plan cho-
sen.90 Furthermore, employers do not place great significance on
quality when making health care decisions for their employees.91
86 See Heritage Offers Proposal for Reform Based on Federal Employees Model, 3
Health Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA) 1073 (July 3, 1995), available in WESTLAW, 3 HCP
27 d47 (describing a voucher system proposed to Congress in 1995 that would pro-
vide for vouchers whose value would correspond to a core set of basic services).
87 See id. An MSA is a tax-protected account where individuals can place money
to pay out-of-pocket expenses relating to health care. See HALL, supra note 24, at 50.
88 See Medicare: Heritage Offers Proposal for Reform Based on Federal Employ-
ees Model, supra note 88, at 1073.
89 See Jonathan Gardner, GOP Seeks Fixed Payments, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Apr.
27, 1998, at 6, 6 (discussing the responses of Alan Greenspan to questions from the
National Bipartisan Commission on the Future of Medicare about changing Medi-
care from a defined benefit structure to a fixed payment system to control costs).
90 See supra Part I.B (discussing this practice as one reason that health care
markets do not function like perfect markets).
91 See Employers Say Health Cost Pressures Hurting Quality of Care, Survey
Finds, 6 Health Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA) 435 (Mar. 9, 1998), available in WESTLAW, 6
HCP 435 (noting that while employers rank cost information as number one in
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The government further distorts incentives in health care pur-
chasing in the employment setting by allowing employers to pro-
vide health insurance without any tax consequences to the em-
ployee.92 To encourage choice based on consumer price and
quality preferences, all tax incentives favoring the provision of
health insurance through employers should be eliminated.93
Employers should still be allowed to provide health insurance to
their employees, but employees would be taxed fully on which-
ever plan was offered. This would minimize any disincentive for
employees to seek insurance outside of the workplace thereby en-
couraging them to choose the standardized level of intended effi-
cacy of care that best reflects their preferences. Besides encour-
aging health care purchasing along price and quality lines, this
system would foster uniform insurance pricing because employ-
ers would no longer have captive groups to promise insurance
agents.94 Accordingly, rates for individuals would approximate
rates for large groups. In this way, the benefits of the implemen-
tation of a choice-based system could accrue to all individuals
that purchase insurance coverage.
Insurers would also need to change their business practices
to make a choice-based system viable. Presently, insurers, espe-
cially managed care plans, subject claims to utilization review
processes to ascertain whether the services provided were medi-
cally necessary.95 Upon standardizing the reimbursement rates
terms of its usefulness in rating health care plans, they rank quality-related infor-
mation such as medical utilization and customer satisfaction, sixth and twelfth, re-
spectively).
92 See supra Part I.B (highlighting this factor as creating market imperfections
within health care).
93 Cf David Nather, House GOP Working Group Developing Plan That May Go
Far Beyond Patient Protections, 6 Health Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA) 731 (May 4, 1998),
available in WESTLAW, 6 HCP 731 (stating that a congressional health care work-
ing group proposed to move away from employer-based health insurance to increase
consumer choice by granting individuals and self-employed people the same tax
benefits as employers).
9 Presently, large employers can use leverage to extract much lower rates from
insurers than either individuals or small companies. See, e.g., Health Plans: A New
Deal for Small Fry, BUS. WM., June 26, 1995, at 142 E2 (describing how the unequal
bargaining power of small companies and individuals in Cleveland has motivated
companies and individuals to create a purchasing cooperative consisting of these
companies and individuals to reduce their health care costs).
95 See supra note 51 and accompanying text (describing how MCO's control pro-
viders' decisions through utilization review).
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to be paid at each reimbursement level for each DRG, insurers
would no longer need to check the medical necessity of the serv-
ices rendered. They would pay the same amount, irrespective of
the services provided. Instead of questioning medical necessity,
they would largely function as underwriters who generate differ-
ent insurance rates for each of the reimbursement levels. Insur-
ers would of course need to continue to check for fraudulent
claims, such as those where upcoding had occurred.96 Through
this system, many of the complaints presently launched against
insurers-that they substituted their judgment for the judgment
of medical professionals-would no longer be applicable. Rather,
this choice-based system would return the power to define the
limits of the provider's agency to the patient, who would make
this determination based on her own price and quality prefer-
ences. These refinements to present insurance practices, as well
as to other health care financing practices, would increase con-
sumers' satisfaction with their health care consumption.
2. Reforms Relating to Legal Liability Arising from the
Financing of Health Care
Despite the rapid progress of the health care industry in the
direction of cost containment, the law has not followed the same
path. Spiraling health care costs have forced the country to con-
sider the cost of its care.97 The law, however, has remained
steadfast in its adherence to a unified standard of care that ig-
nores the economic aspects of health care delivery.98 In taking
this position, the courts have acted as a countervailing force
against the problems that arise both from the insertion of third
parties between the patient and the physician and from the im-
balance of power resulting from the unequal access to informa-
96 Upcoding refers to the practice of submitting a claim to Medicare for a DRG of
a higher reimbursement rate than the DRG actually evidenced by the patient's rec-
ords. See, e.g., Crozer-Chester Medical Center Settles Allegations of Medicare DRG
Upcoding, 6 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1749 (Nov. 13, 1997), available in WESTLAW, 6
BHLR 45 d13 (reporting how one Pennsylvania hospital had been found liable for
regularly upcoding bills involving the treatment of patients with pneumonia).
97 See supra notes 4, 89 and accompanying text (discussing the public's distrust
and discontent with the health care system).
98 See John A. Siliciano, Wealth, Equity, and the Unitary Medical Malpractice
Standard, 77 VA. L. REV. 439, 441 (1991) ("To date, medical malpractice law has re-
fused to recognize formally the economic status of the patient as a factor legitimately
influencing the kind or degree of care the patient receives.").
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tion of the parties in the patient-physician relationship.99 As this
protective force would not be necessary to the same degree under
a choice-based health care system, the law would need to be re-
formed to allow consumer choices to be fulfilled in accordance
with their expectations.
Protecting the sanctity of the patient-physician relationship
against outside encroachment, courts have found liability for
MCO's and other insurers who try to affect physician decision-
making processes. 100 Courts have often imposed liability on these
entities when they have tried to directly control the provision of
services by denying payment for services not deemed "medically
necessary."1 1 They also have discussed the possibility of impos-
ing liability on these entities when their risk-sharing programs
have been found to create an incentive for providers to forego
necessary care.10 2 By imposing liability, courts have limited the
ability of third party payors to significantly reduce health care
costs.
The rationales relied upon in these third party payor cases
would not be applicable to third party payors acting within a
choice-based health care system. Therefore, courts should re-
frain from using the same rationales to find liability in such a
99 See supra Part II (describing how these phenomena have led to increasing
dissatisfaction among the public with its health care system).
100 See, e.g., Dunn v. Praiss, 606 A.2d 862, 868 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992),
rev'd on other grounds, 656 A.2d 413 (N.J. 1995) (finding an HMO vicariously liable
for the negligence of a participating urological group's failure to treat testicular can-
cer where the HMO allegedly exerted control over the physicians through its risk-
sharing payment arrangements); Allison Faber Walsh, Comment, The Legal Attack
on Cost Containment Mechanisms: The Expansion of Liability for Physicians and
Managed Care Organizations 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 207, 234-35 (1997) (discuss-
ing the unreported case of Bush v. Dake, No. 86-25767 NM-2 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Apr. 27,
1989), where the court denied the defendant HMO's motion for summary judgment
after finding that an HMO's risk-sharing arrangements could have contributed to a
participating physician's negligence in detecting cervical cancer).
101 HALL, supra note 24, at 67-68 (stating that despite insurers' attempts to
limit coverage to only medically necessary services, they lose almost 60% of coverage
decision disputes in court); see also Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Liability: A Minefield
for Managed Care?, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 491, 505 (1997) (discussing Fox v. Healthnet,
No. 219692 (Ca. Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 1993), where a jury found an HMO liable for,
inter alia, breach of contract, because the HMO denied reimbursement for a bone
marrow transplant as a treatment for breast cancer on the grounds that the proce-
dure was still "investigational").
102 See Walsh, supra note 100, at 234-35 (discussing the potential of HMO fi-
nancial incentive programs to induce a doctor to provide substandard care).
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system. Under a choice-based system, the term "medical neces-
sity" would no longer be necessary. This term, which has always
lent itself to ambiguity, 03 would be replaced in all agreements
between enrollees and insurers with reference to the standard-
ized levels of intended efficacy to be created by the independent
physician boards. A patient assenting to a level of intended effi-
cacy at the time of entering into an enrollment agreement would
also be deemed to have assented to the corresponding cost con-
straints imposed by the insurer, provided that the enrollee had
received adequate notice about the characteristics of each of the
levels sufficient to make an informed choice. 0 4 Since the enrollee
would be limiting the discretion of the insurer through her en-
rollment choices, courts would better serve the interests of en-
rollees by not mandating any coverage in excess of the coverage
dictated by the enrollee's contract.
Courts should also decline to find insurers liable for any of
the indirect consequences of the implementation of the payment
mechanisms built into a choice-based system. Payment of pro-
viders though a DRG system creates incentives to provide less
care.105 However, this incentive in a choice-based system differs
from the present use of incentives to underutilize medical serv-
ices because the rates would be determined by an independent
third party, which bases these rates on sound medical prac-
tices. 106 Thus, the insurer would not have the necessary control
over the payment process to be a substantial cause in any harm
that might come to a patient receiving care from a provider under
this system. Furthermore, all insurers would be paying similar
rates, which would mean that they were adhering to industry
standards. This adherence can serve to deflect liability for each
103 See, e.g., Medicaid: Medical Necessity Definition Variations will Affect Man-
aged Care Plan Enrollees, 6 Health Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA) 558 (Mar. 30, 1998),
available in WESTLAW, 6 HCP 558 (noting the results of one study that showed
that the breadth of the definition of medical necessity correlated with a beneficiary's
access to care).
104 See Hall, supra note 67, at 585 (stating that consumers must have choices
before their consent can have any meaning); cf id. at 556-57 (arguing that consum-
ers either waive consent or give bundled consent to the economic limitations of their
treatment when they make fully informed decisions to purchase financially con-
strained insurance plans).
105 See RODWIN, supra note 6, at 15.
101 See supra Part III.A (suggesting that independent physician boards create
reimbursement rates).
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individual actor. 107 Accordingly, it would seem discordant with
established legal principles to find liability potentially arising
from the incentives created by these payment mechanisms for in-
surers operating under this proposed system.
Just as courts have acted to protect patients against third
party payors, they have also sided with patients in disputes be-
tween patients and their physicians when the physicians have
considered economic factors in their treatment decisions. Physi-
cians have been found liable when they have not provided all the
services deemed by a court to be necessary, irrespective of the
physician's ability to receive compensation for such services. 108
Likewise, physicians cannot take economic factors into account
when making decisions with respect to terminating the patient-
physician relationship. 10 9 One court has even implied that it is
the physician's personal responsibility to forego payment when
the patient cannot otherwise pay." 0 Thus, despite the fact that
the rise of managed care has adversely impacted physicians'
compensation levels, courts have prevented physicians from
remedying the situation by reducing their expenses in providing
care.
Under a choice-based system, courts would not have to pro-
tect patients from their physicians to the same degree. Under-
lying this protection of patients from physicians acting in their
own interest is the concept that providers, who are the agents of
the patients, owe their patients, the principals, a fiduciary duty
107 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
33 (5th ed. 1984) (asserting that acting similarly to others could be grounds for
finding that the actor has conformed its conduct to the community's idea of reason-
able behavior).
1o See, e.g., Dunn v. Praiss, 606 A.2d 862, 864-65 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1992)
(discussing how the physicians, who were under capitated contracts with an HMO,
had failed to use diagnostic procedures that could have timely discovered the pa-
tient's testicular cancer, and were thus jointly liable with the HMO); Walsh, supra
note 100, at 234 (discussing Bush v. Dake, where the plaintiff alleged fault of both
the physician working under a risk-sharing arrangement, as well as the HMO es-
tablishing the risk-sharing arrangement, where the physician delayed giving the
plaintiff a pap smear or a referral to a specialist).
109 See, e.g., Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d 208, 211-12 (Utah 1937) (stating that it
would be inappropriate for a physician to discontinue medical treatment, for any
reason, "so long as the [condition] requires attention").
110 See Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 819 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a
physician is "ultimate[ly] responsibile]" for the patient's care, irrespective of third
party payor cost limitations).
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of loyalty.' Accordingly, when confronted with a conflict of in-
terest between what is beneficial to the patient and what is bene-
ficial to the physician, the provider must always act in the pa-
tient's interest."12 Since this duty arises from the patient setting
out the terms of the physician's agency, the patient should be
able to limit the scope of the provider's agency to only the provi-
sion of services intended to be covered by the level of reimburse-
ment chosen by the patient at the time of enrollment in her in-
surance plan. 13 In so doing, the patient could consent to any
appearance of a conflict of interest that arises in receiving treat-
ment.114 Removing liability from conflicts of interest through in-
formed consent is already considered standard practice for law-
"' See Mehlman, supra note 66, at 368 (noting that in order to be protected from
breach of fiduciary duties claims, the physician must not only act reasonably, but
loyally).
11 See id. at 370-371.
113 See Martin Gunderson, Eliminating Conflicts of Interest in Managed Care
Organizations Through Disclosure and Consent, 25 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 192, 195
(1997) (discussing how a patient's choice to enroll in an MCO can modify the under-
lying duty of the treating physician to allow her to take into consideration financial
factors in exercising professional judgment).
114 Cf id. (asserting that this consent actually eliminates conflict of interest be-
cause the physician's role has changed by virtue of the consent). But cf id. at 197
(stating that the patient's consent has little value where the patient does not have
many choices among health plans). Besides having the ability to choose among
plans, the doctrine of informed consent to any conflicts potentially arising from the
economic limitations of one's treatment presumes capacity to consent, which would
not be true of children or adults who may not have such a capacity. Though only a
second-best alternative, applicable laws would continue to govern who can consent
for these individuals. Thus, parents would continue to make decisions for their chil-
dren. See Erin A. Nealy, Medical Decision-Making for Children: A Struggle for
Autonomy, 49 SMU L. REV., 133, 152-53 (commenting that the Supreme Court
precedent establishes the rights of parents to make decisions with respect to their
children's health care). There would also be a continuing need to have health care
surrogates make decisions for those who lack the capacity to make such decisions.
See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2965(2)(a) (McKinney 1993) (providing a list of
individuals whose relationship with a patient entitles them to make a decision with
respect to an issuance of an order not to resuscitate the patient when the patient
lacks the capacity to make the decision herself). By emphasizing the importance of
choice in converting to a choice-based system, it is possible that there would be in-
creased efforts to encourage people to pre-commit to the level of intended efficacy of
care they are to receive upon becoming mentally incompetent, similar to the present
use of advance directives. See Ben A. Rich, Advance Directives The Next Generation,
19 J. LEGAL MED. 63, 66 (1998) (labeling the right of patients to indicate their de-
sires upon becoming incompetent, through such measures as written or oral advance
directives, as prospective autonomy, which arises from the doctrine of informed con-
sent).
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yers. 115 Since the patient's will still governs the terms of the pa-
tient-physician relationship, a court would not need to hold the
physician to a higher standard than the one the patient has cho-
sen for herself.
Similarly, tort liability should not attach to the physician's
treatment only because of the physician's decision not to provide
services that are not contemplated by the level of intended effi-
cacy chosen by the patient. In determining liability based on
malpractice for negligent services, courts usually look at what
other practitioners would do under similar circumstances. 116
Under a choice-based system, courts could look at whether the
provider's care conformed to the independent physician board
standards set forth for the patient's DRG at the level of intended
efficacy chosen by the patient. 117 Alternatively, when the pro-
vider and patient have agreed otherwise, courts could look at
whether the proposed course of treatment was nevertheless rea-
sonable."l 8 In any event, courts should not deem a decision not to
provide services that may have been beneficial to be per se evi-
dence of malpractice. In so doing, courts would be honoring the
intentions of the patients in these relationships.
The patient's choice of the level of care should not remove all
liability from the provider. Even where the provider's choice of
services rendered accords perfectly with applicable guidelines,
the provider should still be liable where she fails to act reasona-
bly in administering her care. 119 Not limited to negligence, courts
should impose liability for the commission of intentional torts,
such as battery or the related tort of the breach of the duty to ob-
tain informed consent. The breach of this duty arises where a
115 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1995) (prohibit-
ing lawyers from representing clients where such representation would be "materi-
ally limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or
by the lawyer's own interests, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the repre-
sentation will not be adversely affected, and (2) the client consents after consulta-
tion").
116 See Mehlman, supra note 66, at 362; see also KEETON, supra note 107, § 32.
117 Cf Mehlman, supra note 66, at 362 (noting that the profession can reinter-
pret its own standards to reflect resource constraints).
118 Cf Siliciano, supra note 98, at 481-82 (proposing that even with a resource-
sensitive standard of care, providers should be responsible for their methods of
treatment and diagnosis).
119 Cf id. at 482 (proposing that the competence of providers acting under a re-
source-sensitive standard should still be governed by a malpractice standard).
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provider affected the patient's decision to undergo a suggested
course of treatment to her detriment by omitting to disclose suffi-
cient information about the risks and benefits of a proposed
treatment regimen before administering it.120 Though the doc-
trine initially applied only to cases where a certain procedure
had been performed with adverse consequences, the doctrine has
been expanded in some jurisdictions to include cases where the
provider failed to inform a patient of the risks and benefits of
foregoing potential treatment options that could have had benefi-
cial outcomes. 121 Even in a choice-based system, courts should
still uphold the doctrine of informed consent. Consent is pro-
vided at the time of entry into a health plan only as to the finan-
cial constraints that will arise within the treatment relationship.
Though patients have consented to the financial constraints of
their care at the time of enrollment, they should be informed of
alternatives that might exceed the costs of their present reim-
bursement levels when undergoing treatment.122 The patient can
then decide whether she will pay for the alternative treatment or
seek alternative sources of financing.1' Without the obligation
to obtain informed consent at the time of providing care, physi-
cians would eliminate many of the advantages of a choice-based
system by removing many of the choices that now exist at the
time of treatment. By restructuring liability in this way, courts
can still protect patients when they seek treatment without evis-
cerating the benefits to society of a system that promotes a pa-
tient's price and quality choices.
IV. GIVING CONSUMERS PROVIDER-SPECIFIC PRICE AND QUALITY
INFORMATION
Once various efficacy levels have been established, mecha-
nisms need to be put in place that protect the patient's right to
12 See Hall, supra note 67, at 538-39.
121 See id. at 540 (describing this tort as a violation of the right of "informed re-
fusal").
22 See House GOP Bill Delayed Until June; Outline May Be Ready Before Re-
cess, 6 Health Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA) 818 (May 18, 1998), available in WESTLAW, 6
HCP 818 (reporting that according to one poll, almost "97% of Americans would sup-
port legislation requiring health care providers to give their patients full information
about their... treatment options").
123 See Hall, supra note 67, at 533 (reciting the views of philosophers Paul Men-
zel and Haavi Morreim).
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receive the chosen level of care when actually obtaining treat-
ment. Formulated by independent physician boards using sound,
trustworthy judgment, the reimbursement rates paid to provid-
ers for administering care should be designed to allow providers
to achieve the corresponding levels of efficacy of care that accord
with patient expectations. If, however, there are no systems in
place to foster accountability, providers will have incentives to
provide less beneficial care while receiving the same reimburse-
ment.124 Alternatively, providers will also have the incentive to
encourage patients to pay out-of-pocket for services that they
promise will dramatically increase the efficacy of the care pro-
vided, even when such services have either little or no benefit.
Accordingly, providers should be mandated to disclose all infor-
mation relating to the price and quality of their services that a
reasonable patient would find material. Through such a man-
date, the system would ensure that the patient receives the
quality of care she is entitled to receive at the insurance pre-
mium price she chose, by allowing her to shop for providers
whose performance results accord with the patient's expecta-
tions, and whose costs match the reimbursement rates to which
the patient is entitled.
A. The Function of the Disclosure Model in Securities Laws
As securities disclosure laws were enacted to address many
of the same concerns that are raised in an examination of the
present state of the health care industry, lawmakers can rely on
the body of law regulating securities transactions to set up a dis-
closure system in the health care industry. Prior to the enact-
ment of the securities disclosure laws in 1933 and 1934, the secu-
rities industry was confronting serious difficulty. At the root of
most of these problems was the imbalance of information be-
tween securities sellers and purchasers. 12 This imbalance al-
lowed sellers to take advantage of purchasers by engaging in
124 See supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing DRG incentives).
12 See Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, Introductory Comment: A His-
torical Introduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 335 (1988) (noting that a typical offering circular con-
veys very little information that an investor would need to evaluate a security).
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fraudulent activities and in self-dealing.126 Unaware of the sell-
ers' disingenuous conduct, purchaser demand was excessive,
which led to the purchase of many worthless stocks.127 Upon be-
ing awakened to the dangers of the system by the stock market
crash of 1929, the public grew distrustful of the securities indus-
try.12 Public sentiment against the industry resulted in the gov-
ernment's decision to intervene. 12
President Franklin Roosevelt provided the vision necessary
to advance the reform process. Roosevelt advocated a disclosure
system that would prevent concealment of important information
about a company. There was no guarantee, however, that the
stock would maintain its value.130 Roosevelt's recommendation
stood in sharp contrast with the contemporaneous regulatory
framework based on "merit review," which required that a gov-
ernment authority approve the merits of a security and its price
before it was offered for sale to investors. 131 The disclosure model
was seen as more flexible than a model based on merit regula-
tion.132 It was also viewed as a better method of preventing
wrongdoing in the securities industry.133 Despite initial criti-
cisms that claimed self-regulation would be sufficient or that the
cost factor would be too great, 34 the act became law in 1933.135
1w See id. (discussing how one seller raised over $200 million in selling securi-
ties for bogus corporations); Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to
Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1068-71 (1995) (describing how securities
promoters would reap large undisclosed profits or commissions in selling securities).
12 See Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 125, at 334 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 73-85,
at 2 (1933), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATiVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, item 18, at 2 (J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen P.
Maher eds., 1973), which found that underwriters had to manufacture securities to
satisfy the public demand they had created through their own marketing efforts).
12s See Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 125, at 338 (noting that there had been a
diminution of faith after the market collapse).
12 See id.
130 See id.
131 Mahoney, supra note 126, at 1075-76.
132 See Keller & Geblmann, supra note 125, at 341 (stating that the drafters of
the legislation wanted flexibility without creating the ability to evade congressional
mandates).
13 See id. at 339 (discussing the notion of disclosure of which it has been said
that "'[slunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most effi-
cient policeman'" (quoting LOUIS DEMBITZ BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND
HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 62 (Richard M. Abrams ed. 1967))).
134 See id. at 337 (describing how Hoover adhered to a laissez-faire strategy de-
spite the market crash with the hope that the stock exchange would apply more ef-
fective self-regulatory measures); see also id. at 344 (noting that some critics warned
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The disclosure laws work by promoting the distribution to
investors of important, reliable information. They require the
disclosure in the form of a prospectus of all information that
would be material to a reasonable investor.136 This information
is presented in a standardized format that complies with gener-
ally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP"), as established by
the independent Financial Accounting Standards Board
("FASB"). 137 The credibility of this information is bolstered by
the fact that it is audited by independent accountants. 138 These
auditors, as well as all other parties responsible for generating
the prospectus, certify the veracity of the information contained
within the prospectus. 139 Because this certification could lead to
liability for the auditors or individuals engaged in generating a
prospectus, 140 individuals are more attentive in preparing a pro-
spectus than they would be without the potential liability.' 4 '
This enhanced risk of liability leads to assurances for investors of
the accuracy of the information conveyed in the prospectus. In-
vestors can find even further comfort in the fact that auditors
must also comply with standards promulgated by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (the "AICPA"), a private
organization that governs the manner in which auditors perform
their duties.142 The required disclosure of all material informa-
that the expense of compliance with the proposed legislation would have a chilling
effect on the securities market).
135 See Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994)).
136 See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (1994) (stating that all sales of securities require the
receipt of a prospectus by the investor prior to the sale); 15 U.S.C. § 77j(a)(1) (1994)
(requiring that the information in the registration statement be conveyed in the pro-
spectus); 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994) (creating liability for all untrue statements or
omissions of material fact in the security's registration statement).
137 See STANLEY SIEGEL & DAVID A. SIEGEL, ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL
DISCLOSURE 6-7 (1983) (noting that the SEC has largely deferred to FASB and its
predecessors to establish the principles within GAAP).
138 See 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-01 (1998) (requiring audited balance sheets to be sub-
mitted with certain filings); 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-02(d) (1998) (defining an "audit" as "an
examination of the financial statements by an independent accountant in accordance
with generally accepted auditing standards").
139 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994).
140 See id. (providing that any individual who is misled may sue any person who
signed the registration statement and every director, partner, accountant, engineer,
appraiser, or underwriter involved).
141 See Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 125, at 345.
142 See SIEGEL & SIEGEL, supra note 137, at 130.
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tion regarding securities allows investors to accurately assess the
price and quality of potential investments and to accurately com-
pare stocks.143 This has promoted extraordinary expansion of the
securities industry over time.144
B. Creating a Disclosure System for the Health Care Industry
Just as a lack of information about the value of securities
available before 1933 led to many problems within the securities
industry, many similar problems have arisen within the health
care industry due to a lack of information about the price and
quality of health care services. This similarity suggests that the
health care industry could benefit from the same solutions
proven to be effective in the securities industry context. There is
a greater wealth of information available to the physician than to
the patient in the patient-physician relationship.1 45 Physicians
have taken advantage of this imbalance by engaging in fraudu-
lent activities and in self-dealing. 146 Since physicians who re-
ceive fee-for-service compensation stand to gain from providing
additional services to patients who are unaware of the nature of
the benefits attainable through these procedures, there has also
been a chronic problem of overutilization in the provision of
health care. 147 With the increased prevalence of managed care,
the public has become more sensitized to the financial aspects of
143 See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 77, at 290-95 (asserting that the Ameri-
can securities markets can be characterized as efficient markets, where widely and
cheaply available information about securities is reflected in their price); see also id.
at 13, 143, 161 (explaining that an individual stock's volatility is compared against
the market's volatility to derive a figure known as the stock's beta, which is then
used to determine the stock's risk premium that correlates with its monetary value).
144 Presently, as many as 43% of all Americans own stocks, either directly or
through retirement plans. See Maggie Jackson, The National Pastime: Welcome to
Investing as a Participant Sport, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale.), Sept. 20, 1999, at
19.
145 See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text (discussing the problems that
arise from this imbalance).
146 See RODWIN, supra note 6, at 56 (listing various abuses encouraged by fee-
for-service payments, such as the acceptance of kickbacks by physicians and physi-
cian self-referrals); cf supra note 126-27 and accompanying text (discussing these
problems within the securities industry context).
147 See RODWIN, supra note 6, at 55; cf supra notes 125-26 and accompanying
text (discussing this issue within the context of the securities industry).
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health care, which has led to a growing distrust of providers.'48
Though voluminous in nature, the laws and regulations that gov-
ern the provision of medical services have not succeeded in pro-
viding a system satisfactory to the public.149 Attempts, however,
to legislate a comprehensive disclosure model would likely be met
with criticisms from members of the industry who would levy
charges of burdensome costs or impermissible encroachment into
an area better left to self-regulation. 150 Despite these criticisms,
the success of the disclosure model in the securities industry
militates in favor of creating similar mechanisms to correct the
problems that currently prevent the health care industry from
satisfying consumers.
To maximize consumer satisfaction by allowing consumers to
make informed choices about their health care consumption, all
providers should be required to accumulate reliable, material in-
formation about the quality and cost of their care.' 5 ' Materiality
148 See Mehlman, supra note 66, at 374-75; cf supra note 128 and accompany-
ing text (discussing distrust of the securities industry after the stock market crash of
1929).
149 See David Nather, Bliley, Norwood Said to be Discussing Plan to Create Pri-
vate Program Based on FEHBP, 6 Health Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA) 690 (Apr. 27, 1998),
available in WESTLAW, 6 HCP 690 (quoting one politician as stating that the
Health Care Financing Administration regulations comprise about 45,000 pages and
are therefore overly "cumbersome"); supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the dissatisfaction of the American public with its health care system). The
securities industry also operated previously through regulation of every minute de-
tail of securities offerings, but this system was discarded for the more flexible and
effective disclosure system. See supra text accompanying notes 131-35 (discussing
adoption of the disclosure system).
150 See Gwen Moulton, Private/Public Health Plan Quality Model Revisited with
Mixed Reviews, 6 Health Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA) 343 (Feb. 23, 1998), available in
WESTLAW, 8 HCP 343 (referring to the comments of an executive at Health Insur-
ance Association of America that voluntary accreditation activities are working
well); cf supra note 134 and accompanying text (noting how these objections were
raised against securities reform).
151 Mandatory disclosure of material information relating to providers is not a
new concept. It has most recently been championed by the President's Advisory
Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry. The
Commission, in its report to the President, has suggested that core sets of quality
measures be reported by each sector of the health care industry, including providers.
See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 29, at 74. The report reinforces
other governmental efforts at promulgating data collection. The Health Care Fi-
nancing Administration has published proposed regulations that would require hos-
pitals to collect, analyze, and track data on 12 different aspects of care. See Condi-
tion of Participation: Quality Assessment and Performance Improvement, 62 Fed.
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could be based on whether there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable patient would consider the information useful when
choosing a provider.152 To determine the quality of a given pro-
vider, a reasonable patient would probably be interested in both
medical and non-medical aspects of the provider's services.153
The medical aspects could be expressed through outcomes data,
which would need to be adjusted for case mix severity to convey
Reg. 66,726, 66,756-57 (1997) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R.§ 482.25) (proposed Dec. 19,
1997). Data collection is thus clearly a governmental priority.
The industry itself has also taken steps to monitor quality-related data. The Na-
tional Committee for Quality Assurance ("NCQA') implemented a system that was
to take effect in July, 1999 that would require the submission of health plan per-
formance measures on an annual basis as part of its accreditation program. See
NCQA Redefines Evaluation Process with Standards that Focus on Results, 6 Health
Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA) 593 (Apr. 6, 1998), available in WESTLAW, 6 HCP 593.
Similarly, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
("JCAHO") has established a program requiring hospitals and nursing homes to col-
lect patient outcome data. See J. Duncan Moore Jr. & John Morrissey, Ready, Set,
Go, MOD. HEALTHCARE, June 29, 1998, at 89, 89. Recently, the AMA has announced
its plan to collect physician-related data. See Mary Chris Jaklevic, AMA Eyes Com-
petition, MOD. HEALTHCARE, May 18, 1998, at 42, 42. Though these efforts draw at-
tention to the value and feasibility of data collection, the present design of each of
these programs is limited in terms of the degree to which they promote disclosure of
material information about providers that would be useful to prospective patients.
The NCQA program collects data relating to health plans. See NCQA Redefines
Evaluation Process with Standards that Focus on Results, supra, at 593.
Yet studies indicate that consumers are more interested in provider-specific in-
formation than in information on health plans. See Paul D. Cleary & Susan Edg-
man-Levitan, Health Care Quality, 278 JAMA 1608, 1609 (1997). Though the
JCAHO program requires data collection on the hospital segment of the provider
market, it is limited in the quantity of quality-related data accumulated. Only two
clinical indicators to cover only up to 20% of the patient population are required un-
der the current program. See Moore & Morrissey, supra, at 89. Similar in its lack of
breadth of coverage, the AMA program envisions a minimum credential issuing pro-
cess whereby those providers who meet the set standards would receive a gold star.
See Jaklevic, supra, at 42. Thus, at the present time, no private body has established
a program that truly accumulates all the material price and quality information that
a health care consumer would want.
152 See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that a
physician can discharge his duty to obtain informed consent by giving a patient all
material information about the risks of treatment, which would be those risks poten-
tially affecting the decision of an average, reasonable patient); cf 17 C.F.R. §
230.405 (1999) (defining materiality as the information to which "there is a substan-
tial likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach importance in determining
whether to purchase the security registered").
13 See NCQA Redefines Evaluation Process with Standards that Focus on Re-
sults, supra note 151, at 593 (explaining that NCQA includes both medical data,
such as immunizations, and non-medical data, such as member satisfaction, in its
data collection program).
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truly useful information to prospective patients.154 As the out-
come results are likely achieved by a provider only with respect
to her area of expertise,155 the reasonable patient would want to
know what types of cases the provider treats most frequently in
order to make a determination as to whether her needs would be
met when receiving care from this particular provider. Accord-
ingly, the provider should be mandated to disclose the types of
illnesses she treats most often and the number of patients she
has seen with each of these illnesses within the recent past.
The non-medical aspects of care could be expressed through
a variety of statistics, including consumer satisfaction survey re-
sults. 156 The treatment process is not an instantaneous ex-
change; therefore, a reasonable patient would benefit from a lon-
gitudinal component that would require providers to determine
the status of the patient's health and the degree to which the pa-
tient is satisfied with the provider's aftercare.157 This would also
result in the benefit of encouraging proper follow-up by provid-
ers. Similarly, as the treatment process is often not adminis-
tered merely by one provider, a reasonable patient would proba-
bly want to see a set of measurements aggregating the outcomes
and patient satisfaction data for all of the providers involved in
the medical process that were recommended by the initial pro-
vider.158 This would encourage the initial provider (usually a
154 See Kathleen N. Lohr, How Do We Measure Quality?, HEALTH AFF., May-
June 1997, at 22, 24 (emphasizing that in addition to case-mix adjusted outcomes
measurements, measurements of health care processes should also be considered).
155 See Mary Anne Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy: Protecting Patients from
Their Physicians, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 291, 296 n.9 (1994) (citing various studies that
show that a practitioner's experience with performing a procedure is correlated with
a successful outcome for the procedure).
156 See Cleary & Edgman-Levitan, supra note 151, at 1608-09 (discussing recent
advances in consumer satisfaction surveys, such as the Consumer Assessment of
Health Plans ("CAHPS") project).
157 See id. at 1609 (observing that researchers often focus on one point of time
with respect to the treatment process, despite the fact that patients are interested in
results over the course of time).
158 See id. (pointing to research that shows that patients do not form distinct
images of isolated visits with single clinicians, but rather that they focus on the en-
tire episode of care). By requiring providers to include information regarding other
providers to whom she has referred her patients in her outcome results, this disclo-
sure system would operate similarly to securities regulations requiring companies to
disclose financial information about their subsidiaries, notwithstanding that they
have a separate corporate existence, because of their ability to affect the quality of
the parent's securities. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.301 Instructions to Item 301 (3) (1999)
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primary care physician) to carefully select other providers for her
patients along price and quality lines, irrespective of any oppor-
tunity to obtain personal gains for any such referral.159 Having
received this information, the patient could rationally choose a
provider based on the expected quality of care to be received.
In conveying this quality data, providers should have to fol-
low standardized rules to encourage ease of comprehension and
comparability for prospective patients.160 These rules could be
developed by an independent board, similar in function to the
role played by FASB in the accounting industry. 61 These rules
could mandate, at first, a simple presentation of some of the key
quality of care data in the form of a set of ratings that would
evaluate these data on a scale from one to ten. Initially the data
presented would be limited in number and complexity, but the
presentation could evolve over time as the public's comprehen-
sion of the data grows and its needs with respect to the data be-
come more refined. 62 By allowing flexibility to the standardized
(requiring all securities issuers to include their subsidiaries' financial information
consolidated with their financial data).
159 Cf RODWIN, supra note 6, at 57-67 (discussing how some providers "buy" re-
ferrals from other providers).
160 See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMMIISSION, supra note 29, at 74 (suggesting
that there be standardization in accumulating quality measures for reporting). Since
the three separate bodies of NCQA, JCAHO, and the AMA are presently mandating
quality data collection on their own individual terms, their efforts could not be char-
acterized as standardized. However, these three organizations have announced the
intention of developing uniform quality data collection efforts. See J. Duncan Moore
Jr., Standardizing Standards, MOD. HEALTHCARE, May 25, 1998, at 22, 22. Thus,
quality data collection could become standardized in the near future.
161 See Lynn Etheredge, Promarket Regulation: An SEC-FASB Model, HEALTH
AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 22, 25 (suggesting the creation of a FASB-equlvalent within
the health care industry whose responsibilities would include developing perform-
ance standards). See also Health Care Quality, Education, Security, and Trust Act,
S. 1712, 105th Cong. §§ 101, 106 (1998) (proposing the creation of a Health Quality
Council that would recommend a set of quality indicators and health outcome meas-
urements to both the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Secretary of
Labor) [hereinafter Health Care QUEST Act]; IBM Official Says External Review
Process in Jeffords' Proposal Would Be "Unworkable", 6 Health Care Pol'y Rep.
(BNA) 695 (Apr. 27, 1998), available in WESTLAW, 6 HCP 695 (referring to the
view of one HMO medical director that this Health Quality Council should be an in-
dependent public and private partnership).
12 Cf House Approves Bill to Create Panel to Study What People Value in
Health Care, 7 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 286 (Feb. 19, 1998), available in WESTLAW, 7
BHLR 286 (explaining how Vermont's House has approved a bill to study what its
constituents value in health care); Mahoney, supra note 126, at 1089 (noting how the
SEC has greatly expanded the securities disclosure system over time purportedly to
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format to reflect the public's changing needs, the disclosure sys-
tem would always be a useful tool for comparison shopping by
consumers.
To place the quality information in context, the prospective
patient would need to see all material information relating to
healthcare costs. 163 Once enrolled in a plan that pays providers
at a given reimbursement rate,164 a reasonable patient would
want to know whether the payment of this reimbursement rate
would result in the receipt of services at a level of quality similar
to the level exhibited by the provider's quality data. Accordingly,
the provider should disclose the reimbursement rates necessary
to have covered the charges incurred in her provision of care,
broken down by the percentage of cases that she has treated
within the recent past that could have been covered by each re-
imbursement rate. If an inordinately large number of cases
treated by the provider required a high reimbursement rate to
fully cover the costs of receiving care, a prospective patient would
conclude that the level of quality of care traditionally rendered by
the provider was contingent upon the use of expensive resources
that fall outside of the intended scope of coverage of lower reim-
bursement levels. If the patient enrolls in a lower reimburse-
ment level, she might choose another provider, or she might de-
cide to pay "out of pocket" the portion of care for which insurance
payment would not be sufficient. 65 Once the prospective patient
has access to this cost and quality information, she can deter-
mine which provider will best suit her needs and expectations.
support market efficiency through increasing the availability of material informa-
tion).
163 See Louise Kertesz, What Does it All Mean? Making Sense of Health Plan
Data, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Apr. 20, 1998, at 98, 106 (summarizing the results of one
survey that indicated that consumers want both price and outcomes data to help
them with decisions in selecting providers); cf 17 C.F.R. § 229.201(a)(1) (1999) (re-
quiring the disclosure of securities prices over the past two years to investors).
164 See supra Part III.A (proposing that insurance enrollment involve a patient
choosing one of several standardized levels corresponding to a reimbursement rate
to be paid to providers when they receive care).
1 See supra Part III.A (asserting that when patients decide at the time of
treatment that they want care not covered by their reimbursement level, they should
have the right either to bear the costs of care exceeding the reimbursements to
which they are entitled or to find alternate sources of financing).
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To bolster the reliability of this information, there would
need to be a requirement that the information be audited.166
Auditors would need to remain independent to avoid the appear-
ance of impropriety, thereby establishing trust with consum-
ers. 167 To further ensure the reliability of any disclosed price and
quality data, auditors could be required to certify the information
they have reviewed, which would result in their incurring the
risk of liability.168 Furthermore, auditors should be subject to
rules established by an equivalent to the AICPA with respect to
generally accepted auditing standards for health care data. 69
Through this system of checks and balances, prospective patients
could feel more secure in their ability to choose a provider
matching their desired price and quality criteria.
Once this price and quality information has been accumu-
lated and verified, it would need to be compiled and distributed.
Unlike providers, insurers would know the identity of prospective
patients, irrespective of whether they are currently undergoing
medical treatment. Therefore, insurers should be responsible for
the compilation and distribution of information to their enrol-
lees.170 The information could be compiled in any of several for-
mats.17 1 A printed compilation of information could be distrib-
166 See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 29, at 75 (suggesting
external audits). Although NCQA is requiring audits of quality data it receives, it
does not appear that JCAHO or the AMA have similar plans. See NCQA Redefines
Evaluation Process with Standards that Focus on Results, supra note 151, at 593
(describing NCQA's quality data project); Jaklevic, supra note 151, at 42 (discussing
the AMA's program); Moore & Morrissey, supra note 151, at 89 (examining JCAHO's
initiative).
167 Cf supra note 138 and accompanying text (explaining that auditors working
with securities-related financial disclosures are required to be independent).
168 Cf supra text accompanying notes 136-41 (stating that the risk of liability to
parties certifying a prospectus increases the reliability of the information contained
within the prospectus).
169 NCQA has already begun this initiative. See NCQA Bolsters HEDIS with
Uniform Auditing Standards, MANAGED CARE WEEK, April 14, 1997, available in
1997 WL 9048466 (noting the release of NCQA's new auditing standards).
170 See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 29, at 75 (stating that
health care quality information should be widely available). In fulfilling this role,
insurers can model their practices upon the operations of securities underwriters.
These firms are responsible for communicating with prospective securities purchas-
ers on behalf of issuers. See Stephen P. Ferris et al., An Analysis and Recommenda-
tion for Prestigious Underwriter Participation in IPOs, 17 J. CORP. L. 581, 583
(1992) (describing the tasks a securities underwriter performs).
171 See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 29, at 75 (suggesting
that "multiple modes" be used for presenting health care quality information).
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uted periodically to enrollees,172 and for those who might not
comprehend the import of this information, insurers could have
interactive databases available at their offices or on the Internet
that would explain the meaning of this data.173 The document
would be divided into many small sections, each containing all
the key price and quality data for each provider about whom an
enrollee would want information. Thus, the insurer would likely
provide information about primary care physicians that are lo-
cated in the enrollee's town or zip code, and it would likely pro-
vide information covering a somewhat larger territory for secon-
dary and tertiary care providers.174  Before conveying this
information, the insurer should be required to carefully review
the manner in which providers propose to have their information
presented. All information should be clearly and dispassionately
presented, in a manner devoid of marketing tactics, to ensure
that enrollees use the information to make rational choices re-
garding providers and not emotional ones.175 With this user-
friendly document, the prospective patient could ascertain that
she would receive care at a level of quality she could have antici-
pated when making her decision about the amount she was will-
ing to pay for her insurance. Because the nature of her health
care services thus would correspond with the enrollment choice
she made, it is likely that she would experience increased satis-
faction with the health care system.
172 This could work similarly to the use of prospectuses and annual reports in
the securities industry. See supra Part IVA (discussing the use of prospectuses in
selling securities); see also 3 LARRY D. SODERQUIST, SECURTIEs REGULATION 101-
02 (1990) (discussing the criticisms of the process of compiling a prospectus).
173 See Cleary & Edgman-Levitan, supra note 151, at 1610 (commenting that
information needs vary with different population groups); see also Kertesz, supra
note 162, at 100-02 (discussing how interactive information relating to health care
quality data is already available on-line).
174 See Jack Zwanziger et al., Hospitals and Antitrust: Defining Markets, Setting
Standards, 19 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 423, 432 (1994) (stating that patients are
more willing to travel for specialized services than they are to receive more general
services).
175 See Rice, supra note 9, at 394 (pointing out that marketing can change con-
sumer tastes, which often leads consumers to make choices that do not maximize
their welfare). Securities laws similarly prohibit any emotional appeals to prospec-
tive investors to encourage consumption. See Publication of Information Prior to or
After the Effective Date of a Registration Statement, Securities Act Release No. 33-
3844, at *3 (Oct. 8, 1957), available in 1957 WL 3605 (S.E.C.) (clarifying that it is
unlawful to stimulate the securities market through publicity prior to filing a regis-
tration statement).
[73:651
EMPOWERING PATIENTS
C. Reforms Required to Implement the Disclosure System
1. Reforms Relating to the Implementation of a Disclosure
System
As the present health care environment does not promote
disclosure of material, reliable price and quality information, the
roles of the different actors within health care need to be rede-
fined to allow this information to reach consumers. Employers
are presently the main source of information for most Americans
with respect to health care price and quality, however, they often
do not convey quality information to their enrollees.17 6 Accord-
ingly, employers should not be permitted to remain the conduits
of information any longer. Insurers should replace employers as
the source of health care information. 7 7 This new role would su-
persede various activities in which insurers (especially those op-
erating in managed care environments) presently engage, such
as using leverage over providers to extract the lowest possible
price from them for their services. 78 Under a disclosure system,
the distribution of information about the price and quality of pro-
viders' services to the entire consumer market would lead to
competition among providers to offer the highest quality of care
at the lowest cost.179
Within this proposed system, the function of the Department
of Health and Human Service's Office of the Inspector General
(the "DHHS OIG") would also need to undergo dramatic change.
Since providers would be responsible for incorporating informa-
176 See Kertesz, supra note 163, at 103 (describing the experiences of Medstat
Group and J.D. Power & Associates, who sold health plan and provider report cards
to employers but found that most employers did not forward them to employees).
177 See supra Part IV.B (suggesting that insurers should assume this role).
178 See Amy L. Woodhall, An Antitrust Analysis of Physician Specialty Networks
Under Changing Market Conditions, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 383, 407 (1996) (claiming
that this leverage comes from increasing consolidation in the insurance industry).
179 See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 29, at 75 (stating that
rewarding providers "that demonstrate better performance and higher quality" will
lead to more competition); see also, e.g., Frank Jossi, Money Matters: A BHCAG Up-
date from the Twin Cities, BUS. & HEALTH, Apr. 1998, at 41, 51 (describing how dis-
closure of price and quality information in the competitive Minneapolis market led
to an increase in enrollment for one low cost, high quality physician group); cf supra
note 142 and accompanying text (explaining that disclosure in the securities market
has meant that investors can accurately compare stocks to each other to determine
their value).
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tion about the price and quality of the services of other providers
treating the patients referred by the initial provider, 180 the mar-
ket would create strong disincentives against abusive activities,
such as kickbacks and self-referrals, unless such practices would
not adversely affect the provider's price and quality results. 181
Thus, the DHHS OIG would no longer need to devote its re-
sources to the enforcement of the anti-kickback or self-referral
laws, which would largely become obsolete. 8 2 Assuming a role
similar to that of the SEC, the DHHS OIG could review docu-
ments to be disseminated to the public relating to health care
price and quality information to determine if they appear incom-
plete or misleading.183 Further, it could monitor pronouncements
issued by the equivalents of FASB and the AICPA to ensure that
their rules comport with disclosure principles.'84 It could also
lead the effort in further determining the types of information
that the public would consider material in making health care
choices. 185 By reforming the roles of these parties to promote dis-
closure, the system would ensure that consumers could make in-
formed decisions with respect to their health care delivery.
2. Reforms Relating to Legal Liability Arising Within the
Disclosure System
Similar to liability principles found in the securities laws, a
structure of legal liability would need to be created to encourage
180 See supra note 158 and accompanying text (suggesting this disclosure
mechanism).
181 See supra note 146 and accompanying text (pointing to these practices as
evidence that the system is vulnerable to abuse).
182 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (1994 & Supp. HII 1997) (prohibiting kickbacks
where Medicare or Medicaid payments are involved); 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1994)
(prohibiting physicians from referring patients to entities with which they have a
financial relationship).
183 Cf 15 U.S.C. § 77f (1994) (requiring the filing of a registration statement
with the SEC for its review when issuing securities).
184 See supra note 161 (discussing the Health Care QUEST Act legislation,
which proposes an organization-possibly one that would be a public-private part-
nership-that reports to two governmental agencies on quality indicators); Ether-
edge, supra note 161, at 25 (advocating a public-private collaborative effort in the
area of health care information disclosure similar in structure to the SEC-FASB
model); cf supra notes 137-42 and accompanying text (discussing the interrelation-
ship among the SEC, FASB, and the AICPA).
185 See Etheredge, supra note 161, at 23 (suggesting that the SEC equivalent be
responsible for establishing health care information disclosure requirements); cf
Part IVA (noting that securities disclosure laws have developed over time).
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the completeness and accuracy of the health care price and qual-
ity information provided to consumers. Providers, the entities
who collect and prepare price and quality data, and the auditors
reviewing the data should all be required to certify that they
have used due care in performing their tasks.1 86 If it is shown
that they used less than due care, they should be liable for their
actions. 8 7 The DHHS OIG should be able to file suit against any
party whose actions did not meet the due care standard and col-
lect set penalties that vary with the degree of egregiousness of
the conduct. 188 Patients should also have the right to sue either
individually or as a class. If they win a lawsuit establishing that
they either received material misinformation or failed to receive
material information due to the misfeasance of the parties that
prepared the disclosure, should be entitled to damages. Courts
should award plaintiff patients the fees paid to the provider in
rendering medical care to the patient or patients, irrespective of
whether there had been any adverse outcomes resulting from the
provider's treatment. 8 9 Notwithstanding this recovery of funds,
the damage award for the distribution of misinformation should
not act as a bar against any separate malpractice action against
196 Cf 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a) (1994) (requiring that the issuer sign the registration
statement); 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4) (1994) (holding accountants and other profession-
als liable for any untrue statements of material fact in the registration statement).
187 Cf 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1994) (shielding accountants and other profession-
als, except for the issuer, from liability for untrue statements or omissions of mate-
rial fact only if, after reasonable investigation, such party had reasonable grounds to
believe that the statements in the registration statement were true and there were
no omissions).
18s See Etheredge, supra note 161, at 23 (suggesting that the SEC equivalent in
the health care industry should have the right to investigate and impose sanctions);
ef 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1994 & Supp. I. 1995) (granting the SEC the right to enforce the
securities laws and setting out a penalty schedule).
189 Cf 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994) (granting the right to sue to anyone acquiring a
security when it is subsequently discovered that the registration statement con-
tained an untrue statement or omission of material fact); 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1994)
(allowing recovery of the difference between the amount paid for the security and
the value of the security at the time suit is brought). Though the securities laws
limit recovery to the difference between the purchase price and the value of the se-
curity upon the disclosure of the concealed information, damages within the health
care industry arguably would not have these gradations. Whereas a prospective in-
vestor might still have bought the security, albeit at a lower price, even if she knew
the material information affecting the security's value, the prospective patient would
probably not have used the physician's services at all but for the disclosed price and
quality results that subsequently turned out to be materially inaccurate. Thus, a to-
tal disgorgement of the physician's fees would seem appropriate.
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the provider of substandard treatment. By imposing these strin-
gent liability measures on the parties responsible for the disclo-
sure, patients can be assured that these parties will prepare the
information with the degree of vigilance necessary to allow the
patient to confidently rely on it.
CONCLUSION
This Article has suggested that effectively responding to the
rampant dissatisfaction with the present state of American
health care entails providing price and quality choices with re-
spect to medical care that are not currently available. Consumer
choice can be enhanced by establishing standardized levels of in-
surance that vary in terms of their costs and anticipated levels of
efficacy of care. By choosing a level of care for which they are
willing to pay, consumers could be provided with adequate dis-
closure about material provider price and quality data. Such dis-
closure would allow them to confirm that they are receiving the
care they expected to receive for the price they paid. This system
would increase consumer satisfaction with the health care sys-
tem at several different levels. Most directly, consumer demand
would guide the allocation of resources. 190 Since the provision of
services would be dictated by consumer tastes and preferences,
providers would no longer have the ability to overutilize or un-
derutilize health care inputs.191 This system protects against
overutilization by holding the provider financially liable, in most
cases, for her costs of care in excess of the reimbursement rate
she is to receive from the insurer. 192 Not limited to overutiliza-
tion of the provider's services alone, this system discourages the
provider from causing the services of other providers to be overu-
tilized. This system would mandate that the provider aggregate
price and quality information with respect to the services ad-
ministered by all other providers to her patients where she has
190 See supra Part lA (stating that demand-driven allocation of services is a
benefit derived from a well-functioning market).
191 See supra Part II (describing how the health care system has vacillated be-
tween these two extremes).
192 See RODWIN, supra note 6, at 15 (discussing the incentives created by a DRG
system); see also supra Part III.A (suggesting the implementation of this payment
system); supra note 147 and accompanying text (noting that overutilization has been
a problem confronting the health care industry).
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referred her patients to these providers.193 Because patients
would refrain from using the services of a provider whose aggre-
gated outcomes demonstrated low quality or high prices, this dis-
closure would act as a prophylactic against practices like accept-
ing kickbacks or making self-referrals. 194 This system would also
protect against underutilization because providers would not try
to miniTmnize the amount of services they provide at a given reim-
bursement rate where such restraint would lead to lower quality
results subject to disclosure. 195 Further, unlike providers pres-
ently working in managed care environments, providers under
this system, would not have an incentive to overcompensate for
any uncertainty in receiving reimbursement for their services by
unduly limiting the range of services they provide to patients.196
Rather, they would have complete access to all relevant reim-
bursement information relating to the patient. 197
This system would have a particularly salutary effect on
new, unproven technology. While allowing technological ad-
vances to penetrate into the system, such advances would ini-
tially be financed only by those health care enrollees willing to
19 See supra note 158 and accompanying text (suggesting this mechanism for
enhancing disclosure).
19 See supra note 146 and accompanying text (noting that these practices ad-
versely affect the present health care system); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (1994 &
Supp. I 1997) (prohibiting kickbacks in Medicaid and Medicare payments); 42
U.S.C. § 1395nn (1994) (prohibiting physicians from referring to those with whom
they have a financial relationship).
195 See supra Part IV.B (mandating disclosure of this information under the pro-
posed choice-based system).
196 The uncertainty involved in receipt of payment arises due to MCO utilization
review practices. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (noting that HMO's use
utilization review to contain costs by denying payment for services deemed medically
unnecessary). Though provider reimbursements are subject to utilization review,
providers often are not privy to the methodology used in making utilization review
decisions. See External Appeal of UR Decisions Seems Headed for Enactment in Vir-
ginia, 4 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 227 (Feb. 16, 1995), available in WESTLAW, 4 BHLR
7 d3 (stating that companies using utilization review regard their criteria as pro-
prietary and often do not share it even with physicians). Thus, besides the direct cost
containment effect that comes from denial of payments for services the MCO deems
unnecessary, utilization review also has an indirect effect of incentivizing providers
to avoid providing services where reimbursement is not certain.
19 See supra Part Il.A (suggesting that there be standardized reimbursement
rates dependent upon the level of care chosen by the patient and upon the DRG of
the patient as determined at the time of treatment).
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pay for unproven, experimental treatment regimens. 19 Over
time, access would increase to those high-tech practices that
prove to be both efficacious and cost efficient.199 By controlling
the allocation of resources in this way, health care consumers
could be certain that their health care system would always re-
spond to their continuing needs and wishes.
In addition to preventing the use of resources other than in
accordance with consumer dictates, this choice-based system
would ensure that resources of little or no value would not be
used at all. 200 Under this system, independent physician boards
would determine what practices are considered appropriate to
achieve the expected level of efficacy at each reimbursement level
for each DRG.201 As a practitioner would have access to this in-
formation, she would have an incentive to conform her admini-
stration of care to these established practices unless she had good
reason to believe an alternative course would achieve better re-
sults for the same or less cost.20 2 Thus, practices of little or no
value would be avoided. Similarly, practitioners whose charges
were not justified by their results would find that their services
were not in demand. Prospective patients would be able to com-
pare price and quality results of different providers and would
avoid those of little value.203 These providers would either im-
198 See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (suggesting the creation of a
comprehensive reimbursement level covering all possible treatments). Although ini-
tial access to new technologies would be limited, the alternative is better than the
present managed care environment, that focuses on costs to such an extent that it
jeopardizes the introduction of new, beneficial technologies. See David Wessel,
Health-Cost Trims Hold Inflation Down, WALL ST. J., June 30, 1997, at Al.
199 Cf W. Michael Cox, The Low Cost of Living, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 1998, at
A22 (noting how the cost of new technologies has decreased over time).
200 See supra text accompanying note 21 (stating that in a perfect economy,
there is no wasted production).
201 See supra Part III.A (discussing the mechanics of implementing a choice-
based system).
202 See id. (suggesting that a provider have access to this information but al-
lowing for variation in practice); see also supra Part IV.B (describing how the results
of these treatment sessions would be disclosed). Clinical guidelines have often been
shown to be superior to a provider's individual judgment. See, e.g., J. Duncan Moore
Jr., Teamwork Pays Off, MOD. HEALTHCARE, May 11, 1998, at 28, 28 (describing how
one study of the use of best-practices guidelines for coronary artery bypass grafts in
Pennsylvania showed results of reduced costs and improved quality).
203 See Part IV.B (describing proposed disclosure mechanisms).
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prove the quality of their care or leave the industry.2 4 Through
these disincentives against implementing treatment regimens of
low value, and against engaging the services of overpriced pro-
viders, a choice-based system could minimize the costs of care
without sacrificing quality, thereby further maximizing con-
sumer satisfaction with the health care system.
Not only would this system prevent the use of wasteful
health care inputs, it would ensure that the inputs that were
employed continued to be used with increasing efficiency. 20 5 Be-
cause price and quality results would be shared with prospective
patients, providers would continually strive to achieve higher
quality without increasing costs. 20 6 This would lead them to seek
innovative treatment regimens to maximize quality at a given
cost.207 As these treatment regimens would become the standard
as incorporated by the independent physician boards in deter-
mining reimbursement rates after their efficacy had become cer-
tain,208 there would be a constant need to improve practices to
continue to offer care of higher quality and lower cost than the
standard. Thus, by implementing this choice-based system, the
health care industry would continue to grow more efficient over
time, and result in increasing degrees of consumer satisfaction.
Despite all the benefits that could accrue through this sys-
tem, many might question whether such a system would be fair.
There are many who believe that there should be some degree of
equality in the provision of health care.20 9 Arguably, the differ-
ences between the present system and the system proposed
herein are not as great as they might seem. Even now, the affilu-
204 Cf David Nather, Managed Care Debate Aimed at Public, but Close Look at
Polls Shows Mixed Signals, 6 HEALTH CARE POLY REP. (BNA) 1095 (July 6, 1998),
available in WESTLAW, 6 HCP 1095 (quoting one congressional aide as stating that
disclosure requirements for health plans would put bad actors out of business).
205 See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text (observing that innovation is
encouraged in well-functioning markets).
20 See supra note 179 and accompanying text (asserting that price and quality
competition would be enhanced under this proposed system).
207 Cf Havighurst, supra note 73, at 116-17 (suggesting that society allow for
competing guidelines to get the best value out of health care).
20m See supra note 74 and accompanying text (positing that there should be an
exchange between practitioners in the field and the independent physician boards).
2w Cf Rice, supra note 9, at 391 (commenting that since people are concerned
about the well being of others, a redistribution mechanism would increase each per-
son's utility by assuaging this concern, thereby increasing market efficiency).
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ent can in some cases afford to pay for medical care that others
cannot buy, such as services not deemed to be medically neces-
sary and thus not reimbursable by an insurer. To the degree
that the public wishes to appease its equitable sensibilities, it can
act through the political process. If, under either the present
system or a choice-based system, the American people strongly
wish to grant the necessary health care financing to allow un-
limited access to medical resources to certain classes of individu-
als, such as the gravely ill, it can do so through the govern-
ment.210 The political process can also help alleviate the problem
of providing health care to the poor, both those on Medicaid and
those who are presently uninsured due to an inability to pay for
health insurance. 211 Yet it is suggested that, in these instances,
granting choice among different uses of the money to be distrib-
uted to this population could maximize the satisfaction these
people attain in purchasing health care. Similar to what has
been proposed for Medicare, vouchers could be distributed for
whatever amount is deemed equitable by the American public.212
These vouchers could be used for some combination of health in-
surance, MSAs, and cash.2 13 Irrespective of how any such redis-
tributive mechanisms are to operate, their success could be en-
hanced by their implementation in a system that has already
maximized public benefit through the fostering of price and
quality choices. That is, before any equitable redistribution oc-
curs, it is better first to maximize the wealth within the system,
thereby increasing the size of the wealth of each party entitled to
a share of it after any subsequent reallocation.21 4 In this way,
210 See Albert R. Hunt, Public is Split on How to Pay for Access, WALL ST. J.,
June 25, 1998, at A10 (noting that one survey found that at least two-thirds of all
individuals are in favor of the government's guaranteeing access to the best health
care technology available).
211 See id. (finding that the results of one survey indicate overwhelming support
for the notion that everyone should have access to health care).
212 See Enthoven & Singer, supra note 10, at 28 (asserting that a voucher sys-
tem would be necessary to achieve universal or near-universal coverage).
213 See supra Part III.B (discussing this possibility within the context of Medi-
care). Some might argue that it is unrealistic to expect individuals facing economic
hardship to use the vouchers for any other purpose than to redeem them for cash.
Though counter to the principles inherent in a choice-based system, the cash re-
demption option could be eliminated to guarantee that the vouchers were used for
medical purposes only, making the proposal more politically acceptable.
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the political process could benefit from the efficiencies created by
a choice-based system.
Not limited to addressing questions of equity, the political
system would also need to champion many of the mechanisms
geared toward improving efficiency discussed in this Article be-
fore they could be applied to the health care industry. In consid-
ering whether to act upon the choice-based suggestions contained
herein, legislators would need to evaluate the impact of these
suggestions on different actors within the health care industry,
many of whom are heavily involved in lobbying activities.
215
MCO's would fear that a choice-based system would eliminate
their role entirely. Their success has largely been driven by their
ability to convince employers that they can keep costs down by
reducing the provision of supposedly unnecessary care, and by
negotiating favorable rates with providers. 216 Although MCO's
would no longer carry out these functions under this choice-based
system,217 they could continue to profit from their expertise in
cost management. Under the new system, MCO's could offer to
sell providers guidelines that surpass the ones promulgated by
the independent physician boards in delivering high quality care
at low costs. 218 Thus, the most desirable attribute of MCO's could
continue even under the new system.219
Providers would not likely be unified in their reaction to any
choice-based system. Those who know they provide high quality,
low cost services would clearly be in favor of legislation that
would lead to their ability to publicize their superiority. Provid-
ers who are less certain about where they stand relative to their
214 See POLINSKY, supra note 11, at 9 (asserting that, where income can be cos-
tlessly redistributed, it is better to maximize efficiency before engaging in any redis-
tribution of wealth).
215 See, e.g., Eric Weissenstein, Donations Heating Up, MOD. HEALTHCARE, July
13, 1998 at 33, 33 (observing that in the first half of 1998, over $4 million was con-
tributed to political candidates by various health care provider associations and by
associations representing insurers).
216 See Anders & Winslow, supra note 2, at A8 (stating that the financial prob-
lems of HMO's can be linked, in part, to their restriction of consumers' choices).
217 See supra Part IHA (describing how MCO's would no longer need to fill these
roles in a choice-based system).
218 See Havighurst, supra note 73, at 88 (explaining the benefits of using com-
peting guidelines).
219 See Anders & Winslow, supra note 2, at Al (noting that MCO's had broad
support when they appeared to be capable of lowering costs while improving qual-
ity).
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competition would be less supportive of any legislation in this
area. It is, however, possible to garner the support of the entire
provider community for this legislation by highlighting that it
would largely remove the influences of MCO's and employers in
the provision of care-issues that have proved important for pro-
viders. 220
Though employers face a diminished role in the health care
system, it is unlikely they would oppose any advances towards a
choice-based system. Employers would immediately achieve
savings in the area of human resources, and they would experi-
ence permanent relief from further assaults to their bottom lines
due to rising health care costs. Furthermore, while employers
may remain indifferent, labor unions would likely launch strong
criticism against any choice-based system. They have fought
hard for control over health benefits, and thus would not easily
accept a return to full taxability of these benefits.221 Their con-
cerns could, however, be deflated by enacting the choice-based
system in a tax neutral fashion such that taxpayers would be
compensated for the taxes levied on health care benefits by re-
ceiving a comparable reduction in overall income taxes. In this
way, the proposed system could deflect criticism from both the
unions and the workers they represent.
Since the operations of DHHS would also undergo change, it
is conceivable that it too would attempt to block the enactment of
legislation resulting in choice-based health care. Although it
would no longer need to set provider Medicare rates or enforce
laws preventing overutilization of medical services provided un-
der government programs,222 it would find that its power base
was significantly increased by its authority over provider disclo-
sures of price and quality data.223 Unlike the regulation of Medi-
care and Medicaid, the regulation of disclosure documents con-
220 See Anders & Winslow, supra note 2, at A8 (reporting that the AMA has en-
couraged its members to contact legislators about MCO abuses); AMA Pushes Ex-
panded Health Plan Choice, BUS. & HEALTH, July 1998, at 10, 10 (stating that the
AMA has expressed its support of tax parity for individuals who purchase health
care outside of the employment setting to discourage employer interference in the
provision of health care).
221 See STARR, supra note 31, at 310-20 (describing the rise of unions to a posi-
tion of prominence in the health care arena).
222 See supra Parts III.B, lV.C (suggesting these changes).
223 See Part IV.C (proposing that the DHHS OIG receive SEC-like authority).
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templated herein would include disclosure statements relating to
the care provided to all patients. This would broaden DHHS's
authority to cover, for the first time, the provision of health care
services to the entire American public.224 Whereas all of these
parties would experience mixed fortunes from a choice-based sys-
tem, only consumers would experience an unqualified, significant
benefit from this system. Consumers, however, are also the least
organized group in terms of political power. To truly succeed at
effecting change, consumer dissatisfaction must be channeled
through consumer action groups.225 These groups must strongly
voice their concerns over the lack of ability of consumers to make
informed choices with respect to their health care. Since, to some
extent, consumer voices are beginning to be heard, the changes
proposed in this Article should serve as a basis for ensuing dis-
cussions relating to the next logical step in the evolution of the
health care industry.
24 On the federal level, this system would offer benefits not attainable by en-
acting similar changes at the state level. Cf Enthoven & Singer, supra note 10, at 32
(suggesting that a national policy dealing with managed care would promote regula-
tory coherence and internal consistency).
= See RODWIN, supra note 6, at 247 (observing that organized advocacy has of-
ten played an instrumental role in affecting desired changes).
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